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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
The edges af tha summit still appal
Whan wa breed an tha dead ar tha beloved;
Nar aan imaginatian da it all
In this last plaoa af light; ha dares ta live
Wha staps being a bird, yat baats his wings
Against tha immansa immaasurabla amptinass af things.
- Thaadara Raathka

Tha history af the concentration camps should raquira no repatitian.
Yet, recent evidence indicates that in fact the events are baing
forgotten, and worse, where remembered, they are distorted beyond
recognition. While it is net within the scope of this paper to re¬
construct the tragedy of the Nazi years an understanding of tha bread
psychological implications for tha survivor is essential. This intro¬
ductory overview is also

distorting, far by tha vary nature of its

abstractness it will absaure and dilute tha horrific realities of tha
camps. But perhaps it is only through this veil of abstraations that wa
may approximate realities that might otherwise be unapproachable.
Th® concentration eamps were a moral-historical vacuum. A moral
vacuum in the sense that all ethical distinctions were suspended 8
good and evil, humaneness and inhumanity were maided into a total
negation of personal responsibility. Tha ceneemmitant historical
vacuum resulted from an abrogation of causality? the relationship
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between deed and event, actien and consequence was suddenly, and
without the hint of an end, suspended.
Threats te the sense of existential well-being were everywhere
implicit and toe often explicitely executed.

Prisoners saw their

children die, their strivings rendered meaningless, their race on the
verge of extinction, and the natural world itself, both human and nenhuman, rapidly disintegrating. On every level the sense ef connectien
with the ambient and the remembered was severed. In the face ef
repeated exposure te brutal death, reasonless dying, and the disrup¬
tion ef the entire social matrix the concentration camp prisoner felt
completely abandoned by and closed off from these herited modes by
which his historical community maintained its psychic integrity. He
was forced instead te confront all the terrors that connection with
these communal modes protected him from.
The singularity ef the experience lies in the distinctive manner
in which it affects the survivor’s sense ef himself as part ef an
ordered universe. History records disasters ef greater magnitude, the
plagues ef the Middle Ages for example, but as natural holocausts their
origins could always be ascribed te seme Grand Design. The concentration
camps, however, represented the first time for a man-made violence in
which no tenable motive could be found. Even prior wars were spoken ef
as £erusadesK - they either had the rags ef reason or were considered
to stem from uncivilized heathens® But here fer the first time men who
were part ef a culture that could hardly be considered barbaric made
savagery a mode ef being, made brutality a cause fer its own sake®
Hireshima was seen te beceme the sister image ef tetipetent techno-
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logical violence, but Hiroshima was vicarious; the pilots never saw
the people they destroyed. The concentration cam's are unique in that
they ushered in a technological vialence cenducted an a faca-ta-faca
level without the psychological distance of the bembadier's telescope.
Simply, the survivor is thrust into a chaos where net only are the
landmarks of his existence utterly dislocated but where ary sense of,
or hope far, ultimate purpose is negated by an all-tee-real vision of
human bestiality.
It has always seemed that the saving grace of this graceless
period was that seme had managed to survive it© Far many, though, it
appears that even this was no gift. Many survivors had permanent
physical impairments and many mere found themselves engaged in an
interminable debilitating struggle with their memories of the camps.
Rather than being grateful or joyful a large number of concentration
camp survivors are scarred in such a way that guilt ever surviving is
their major affective response. They are tortured by self-recrimination*
for their "failure" to die, and thus for many the sequelae have become
mere unremitting than the camps themselves.
The Goethe Oak - under which, legend has it, Goethe wrote seme ef
his finest poems - steed at the center ef the concentration camp
Buchenwald. I take this to be the central paradox we must confront
when evaluating the efficacy ef ary reasoned inquiry, and if throughout
these pages a dark pessimism seems to emerge it is because ray own
pest-Helecaust sense is that ef T.W. Adorno who said "No poetry after
Auschwitz." Despite this, and perhaps simply because I knew ef no ether
way, I have attempted te understand survivor guilt in the rather faint
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hop* that reason is the beginning of healing.
I came to this study with many questions. What is survivor guilt?
I
Why does guilt rather than fear or anger appoar as the focus of
the survivor? Whoro can wo placo this guilt in the continuum between
the normal and pathological? Does it fit into th* classic psychiatric
formulations? What ar* its implications for all of us who arc in a
sense survivors in an ago of unprecedented violence? And the question
one always dreads to ask for foar of the answer? Is there any relief
to be found for these bearing this burden *f guilt?
In an effert tc answer these and ether questions I have traversed
a rather eircuitous route. The problem turned out te be much different
than that which I had anticipated. From a beginning invelving classical
analytic theories *f guilt I found myself becoming more and more
involvsd with elemental issues bearing #n eur perceived rhythms *f life
and death. I had the feeling throughout that I was piecing tegether a
jig-saw puzzle in which each piece was meaningful in itself, and which
then became even mere significant as it began connecting te the whole.
The format *f the paper reflects seme ”jig-saw puzzle** aspects ef my
attempting te delineate a eehesiv* statement from seme very disparate
theeretieal phrases.
The paper is divided int# five majer parts. Fellewing this intro¬
duction, the secend section deals with the clinical context ef survivor
guilt, delineating it from the tetal eenstellatien ef symptematelegy
known as th© survivor syndrome. A third chapter, entitled "Images”, is
the data ef this work and as such it is the central chapter. It documents
the ways by whieh the survivor turns historical actuality into a
distorted but crucial psychological reality with guilt as th# primary
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component. Various theoretical issues discussed in the psychiatric
literature bear directly on this imagery and are breught tegether in

i

a fourth chapter which provides the matrix for Chapter 5 - "Toward
a Theory of Survivor Guilt", an effort to presont a unified theory
by which we may account for the centinued misery that is the legacy
ef the cencentratien camps*

CHAPTER II

SURVIVORS

.... Neither does the actor suffer
Nor the patient act. But both are fixed
In an eternal action, an eternal patience
Te which all must consent that it may be willed
And which all must suffer that they may will it
That the pattern may subsist, for the pattern is the action
And the suffering, that the wheel may turn and still
Be forever still.
~ T.S. Eliet

Survivor guilt fer clinician and casual observer alike is often
obscured by a plethora of seemingly mere prefound and pronounced
symptoms.At once the preblera in examining survivor guilt is te separate
it from tho encumbrances of its clinical setting and, at the same time,
to presorve its intogrity within that setting. This admixture of
symptoms is known as the survivor syndrome and as it often acts, via its
various component elements, te ebscure the central dilemma ef the
survivor - that is, guilt - it becomes necessary te clearly delineate
its borders.
wThe theme is new, eur nosologic categories are toe incomplete te
define it.w This remark (translated frem the German) ^

is one ef the

earliest reactions in the psychiatric literature te the censtellatien
of symptoms we have come te term the survivor syndrome. As with any
new diagnostic category there eemeg an array ef names, each reflecting
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a particular bias en the part of the author. The survivor syndrome
is n« exception as it has been variously called "Repatriation
Neurosis," ^ "Chronic Traumatogenic Anxiety Syndrome," 3
"Persecution Syndrome," ^

and "Concentration Camp Syndrome9" 5

among others. To indicate ray own emphases I would refer to it as the
"Cencantratien Camp Survivor Syndrome" to underscore its unique
qualities as an experience devolving from the concentration eamps and,
at the same time, emphasize these qualities that are shared with
survivors of ether disasters. For brevity's sake, however, and with
the hope that my intentions are evident, I will simply refer to this
constellation of symptoms as the "survivor syndrome" - discarding
even the quotation marks.
The component elements of the survivor syndrome have been examined
by several groups with the most extensive breakdown having boon made
by Nathan, Eitinger, and Winnik ^

who list a total of forty-seven

different elements. Their clinical picture can be considerably
condensed by noting the prevailing general categories. These are*
depression, somatization, "affective anesthesia" 7? intense anxiety
with frequent nightmares, the inability to forget the experience, and
o

guilt.0

Generally the syndrome is marked try its chrenicity.

The depression, referred to by Hoppe as a chronic reactive
depression 9 9 ±s all-pervasive, characterized by feelings of helpless¬
ness-hopelessness, and less of self-esteem

whieh seems to be

closely linked in intensity with the depth of the depressien. ^
Interestingly, hewever, suicidal tendencies de net seem te be as

\
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frequent in th* depression of th* survivor syndrom* as compared to
othor typos of depression; th* most rocont evidence indicates, instead,
an exceedingly low incidences of suicides among concentration camp

.
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survivors •

Related to the depression is a feeling of emotional coldness-an
affective anesthesia. This may itself be an expression of depression
or it may be the reverse, that
Having lost most if not all, of their early love objects,
they now fear that to love anyone means to lose them and
go through the pain all over again. Since they have not
boon able to work through their losses such a situation
threatens overwhelming depression.1*
Rather than an expression of depression it is a means of avoiding the
depression. It may b* an aspect ef what Lifton has called "psychic
numbing"1^. Another observer considers it a carry-over of the defensive
repression of affects that aided survival in the camps.^ Whatever th*
case may be the depression and affective lameness are th# major factors
in the devastating social isolation frequently seen in these survivors.
Somatization of affect was among the earliest noted elements of tho
survivor syndrome. As early as 1948 Friedman noted the emergence of
psychosomatic complaints.
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In a more recont study Hoppe found psycho-

somatic complaints in 144 out of 145 survivors studied.

17
' My own

1
\

feeling is that there is a large element of "Homines Credunt...."

j.n

his criteria for psychosoma, but even leavening the statistics with
the proverbial grain ef salt still yields an impressive psyehesematie
ingredient in the surviver syndrome. A second issue, and a much mer«
important ono, is whether our labelling the sematic complaints ef
survivers as "psyche" in origin is realistic, or ar* we using th*
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term to define away our lack ef knowledge about the physiologic
effects of massive physical and mental trauma.
With these objections in mind, however, it is still worth noting
that the idea of a markedly increased incidence of psychosomatic
complaints is given credence by (and lends credence to) George Engel’s
thesis that the state of "helplessness-hopelessness" or "giving upgiven up"—clearly present in the camps
of somatic complaints.

19

18

-is the major psychic inducer

There is also the suggestion that these somatic

ailments may be particularly related to guilt, for as Engel points
out elsewhere, these are "pain-prone" patients who will frequently
utilize pain as a means of expiating their guilt.

20

The most apparent and well-known element ef the survivor syndrome
is the intense anxiety state ef the survivor

manifesting itself in

insomnia, nightmares, motor unrest, and fears of renewed persecution
often culminating in paranoid ideation
complaints.

23
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as well as psychosomatic

The nightmares particularly may give us clues to the

anxiety-provoking memories of the survivor. Trautman notes that the
nightmares are nearly always characterized by an overwhelming fear of
existential destruction, utter helplessness and a complete absence of
counter aggression.

24

The last two elements have also been recognized

in citizens living under the Nazi regime who had net been in concentration camps.

25

The fear ©f existential destruction however, seems to be

unique to the concentration camp survivor. This is an important
distinction, for, as Trautman suggests, the background ©f the survivors
anxiety and its quintessential expression in the nightmare lies in
his fear of being killed <,^6 This and the observation that fear ef
death was a frequent complaint among survivors suggests the impertance
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dream also supports this cententien* survivors with happy dreams abeut
their dead family members shewed significantly fewer manifostatiens

which he observed that the incidence ef sleep disturbances was highest
among groups with the least well-defined, least ritualized, meurning
processes,

29

and, the reverse, that comforting dreams indicated a

«?d sleep disturbances among concentration camp survivors may, then

with the hypertrophied fear ef existential destruction which Trautman
describes.
Perhaps the most important feature ef these nightmares is that
each survivor seems to have a particular image involving a person.

the first suggestion ef a theme that will be fully developed in this
work: that there is a residual imagery abstracted from the camp
experience which becomes the metaphor for the entire event and one’s
sense ef place within that ©vent. The quotidian recurrence ef parti¬
cular themes and images in fully-develeped nen-symbelic ferm (except
in a synocdechic way) suggests that this imagery may be a majer
principle behind the muretie manifestations ef the survivor syndrome.
The undisguised clarity ef these dreams impairs net only the ability
to find succour in sleep, but to escape frem the waking memeries as well,
I have saved the guilt cemponent ef the surviver syndreme for
last because frem this peint ®n the paper will be primarily cencerned
with the place ef guilt as cempenent and cause ef the surviver syndreme.
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Almost immediately after the war Friedman noted that among survivors
he met in the Displaced Persons camps "many often spoke openly of their
guilt; in others however oven this guilt was repressed or concealed."^
Somewhat later as the presence ef guilt among survivors became an
established fact the nature of the guilt became elucidated# Eitinger
neted that
Partly unconsciously, and more often than not without any
rational foundation of the survivors upbraid themselves for
not sharing the fate of the others, saying that they have
betrayed them in this way, that they are indirectly
accemplices te their death.
The majority ef cases with feelings ef guilt and selfrepreach fer lack ef activity prev© te be of a neurotic
nature, when they are examined mere closely.-^
In subsequent case histeries surviver guilt is always phrased in
terms ef imagined causality and prierity. The very expressiens from
varieus reports are all variatiens en these themes*
What right de I have te be happy when my methor and all
my relatives had te die.36
If my neighbor gets killed befere I de, I get anether
chance te live# *'
Why am I the ene whe survived? Why didn’t I save them?
Why was I saved myself? 3°
Why was I net the ene destined te die? 39
Each questien has in it the thread ef self-repreach and an image ef
survival fer another’s sacrifice# This is a crucial difference between
concentration camp survivors and the survivors of Hiroshima whe retain
a similar residual imagery# Where both have a sens* ef guilt ever
net having helped th® dead it appears that it is enly the former group
that can avail itself ef a set ef distinetly articulated, grotesque
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circumstances which both allows and fosters a perception that the dead
willfully sacrificed themselves so that others might survive. Chedeff's
clinical expertence bears this out*
Feelings of guilt, mentioned spontaneously by seven patients
and brought out by questioning in others, were related to
the fact that they had survived the holocaust, while their
parents, other relatives and friends had been killed...
sometimes connected to a particular episode when the patient
felt that different behavior on his part might have saved
someone's life, but more often such feelings were related
simply to their having survived when se many had been
destroyed.**0
The mest comprehensive bedy ef werk en survivor guilt has been dene
by William Niederland***, individually and with Henry Krystal.^ The
cenclusion ef their werk is that guilt stands eut as the single mest
impertant pathegenetic facter in the surviver syndreme

43

*

feelings ef guilt and shame are ef the mest prefeund order
and stand at the bettem ef many ef their clinical manifes¬
tations.^*
The clinical manifestations, in turn, are seen te arise frem twe
separate, yet intertwined components ef guilt. A depressive component
gives rise te apathy, withdrawal, seclusien9permanent change ef feelings
te these ef less, sadness, and depression. A persecutory element engenders
fear, vigilance, and paraneid reactions.**5 In ether words, the whele
spectrum ef the survivor syndrome can be generated by guilt©
It is worthwhile te note here the similarity ef responses seen
among survivors ©f other extreme situations,* particularly in examining

♦Throughout this pacer I will be comparing the experiences of the
concentration camp survivor to two other groups of survivors. The first
is the general category of hurricanes, floods, mine-cave ins and combat
which because of their similarities in sequelae I have grouped under
the heading ef the Extreme Situation. The second group are the survivors
of Hiroshima, or hibakusha© I have chosen te compare this group separately
for their sequelae represent a radical departure from these ef previous
disasters and come closest te the experience ef the camps©
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the long-term

sequela*. The studies ef Archibald and Tuddenham en

survivers of cembat stress revealed a rather chronic pattern ef
psychopathology which they named the "Cembat Syndrome." It is
characterized by intense anxiety, recurrent nightmares, frequent
hA

headaches, and increased irritability.

If this has a ring ef

familiarity Ch*doff*s comment will make the connection evident*
Particularly striking is the marked startle reaction in
both groups of patients i.e.,soldiers and concentration
camp survivors which instead of becoming attenuated as
time passes seems t* get reinforced each time it is activated
by a new stress stimulus, s* that the organism appears t*
become more *r less permanently conditioned t* this kind ef
reaction. As I see it the differences between the concentration
camp patients and the cembat fatigue group are quantitative
rather than qualitative.**?
The major difference between the two groups seems t* be one ef quantity
rather than quality. Qualitatively there are marked similarities* mere
than half ef these with the "Cembat Syndrome" had been wounded in battle
and the group as a whole had witnessed far mere atrocities than a
control group. Similarly, they are considerably mere guilt-laden
hQ

and shew a heightened concern ever harming people.Here tee the
implication is that death imagery and guilt are interconnected ma jer
factors.
In a variety ef different survivor groups Welfenstein
ethers

^ and

^ have noted elements ef survivor guilt. For the most part,

however, it was considered relatively rare and inconsequential. The
important point is that even among these groups in which guilt dees
net appear in significant fashion, it is most pronounced among these
who have been closer to, or witnessed, death. The degree ef guilt
seems t* be directly related t* the extent ef death anxiety felt by
the survivor. In the case ef the concentration camp survivor his
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guilt appears to be a magnification ef this universal phenomenen
resulting frem the singular psychehistorical makeup ef the victims
and the structure ef the camps which played en this makeup.
This conjunction ef circumstance and psychedynamics preduced in
the cencentratien camp survivor a complex ef guilt-induced manifestations
that may emerge in a variety ef forms. It can be seen clinically as a
form ef pathological mourning
in which the survivor is stuck in a magnification ef guilt
which is present in every bereaved person. The ambivalence,
or mere precisely, the repressed aggression, toward the lest
object prevents the completion of the work ef mourning*
Hidden in the self-repreach ... is their repressed rage
against the new murdered parents who failed to pretect them
frem the persecution.51
On the ether hand it may escape clinical detection by being channeled
into socially condoned or acceptable activities. At ether times this
all-important guilt maysimply elude the unwary clinical eye.
Since survivor guilt represents an almost intolerable
burden it is usually not permitted to enter consciousness,
remains for the most part repressed, and tends to manifest
itself clinically in the depressive, persecutory, psycho¬
somatic, and neurevegetative symptoms of the patient, or
very rarely in complete denial.*2
What we have is akin to an archeological excavation site in which the
death imagery is buried beneath the later village ef guilt images which
in turn is cevered by a mere recent city of the survivor syndrome.
The refractoriness ef the survivor syndrom© may lie in the fact that
simply te uncover its various levels is a long arduous process
frequently yielding only fragmentary results*
In the next section we will excavate the repository ef memories
that is the survivals legacy by examining the shared imagery retained
by many as their personal remnant ef the experience. It is this imagery

which stands at the reet ef surviver guilt, and hence, ef the surviver
syndreme.

CHAPTER III

IMAGES

We, the rescued.
From whose hollow bonos death had begun to whittle his flutes
And on whose sinews he had already stroked his bow Our bodies continue to lament
With their mutilated music#
We, the rescued,
The nooses wound for eur neck still dangle
Before us in the blue air Hourglasses still fill with eur dripping bleed.
We, the rescued,
The worms of fear still feed on us#
- Nelly Sachs

The Data
The data frem which the imagery of the survivor is abstracted
derives from two sourcest the fictions and memoirs of survivors, and,
the major source of the material, a series of interviews conducted by
one David Beder during 19^6 in the Displaced Persons camps of Europe.
The first source needs no introduction; the second, however, requires
seme discussion and description of the methodological problems
associated with its use#
Dr# David Beder, at that time a psychologist at the Illinois
Institute of Technology, recorded and subsequently translated, mainly
frem German, Yiddish, and Polish, seventy interviews with displaced
persons# The object of these interviews was to leave a rocerd of
survivor experiences for future researchers and as a valuable object
in itself# Eight of these interviews initially appeared in a book
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entitled I Old Not Interview the Dead

53

. tho title emphasizing
1

the fact that no record could be complete because the experiences of t
these who perished could never be known. The full compilation of
interviews is titled Topical Autobiographies of Displaced People?
Recorded in Displaced Persons Camps with a_ Psychological and Anthro¬
pological Analysis.^
There are several problems in using data in which one serves as a
vicariously vicarious interpreter, at best. The interviews lack,
outside of what we may make of the words themselves and tho occasional
editorial note by Boder to indicato crying during the interview, those
non-verbal indicators of meaning-innuendos of expression and dictienthat often change entire meanings. Tho Issue of linguistic distortion
inherent in any translation must also bo considered. In essence the
analysis must be incomplete, and, in a sense, inauthentic, for rather
than examining tho expression (in tho sense of tho total mental operation)
of the speaker we are confined entirely to tho statement (the meaning
of the words

alene.)55

In a similar vein are the preblems that arise when using someone
else*s interviews. In this case I consider these interviews tee have
been far toe directed, and the direction itself unsatisfactory. The
emphasis is en what happened rather than on hew one felt about it.
Though never quite printed this way my frustrated psychological
predilections often felt that the transcripts road as follows?
Survivor?
I really felt .
Interviewers
Never mind that, let*s get back t© tho facts®
Despite this emphasis the psychological facts do emerge, and in a rare¬
fied form, demonstrating that human description even of the historical
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events of one*s life is always a psychohistory no matter what the
interviewer's or interviewee's intentions may be.
This brings us to the matter of the interviewer's biases. In Boder's
case they were extraordinarily minimal. Though the title implies some
interpretive proclivity, the text has little in the way of analysis either
before or after the interviews. He began the interviews, sitting behind
his subject, with this prefacet
We know very little in America about the things that
happened to you people who were in the concentration
camps. If you want to help us out, by contributing
information about the fate of the displaced person,
tell us your personal story. Tell us what is your
name, how old you are and where you were and what
happened when the war started.
A set of "psychological” documents, in the sense that they wore done by
a psychologist, without a gross theoretical bias is a rare thing indeed,
and Boder's decumonts stand eut in that they seem to have been done
with no polemic intention. By being this kind of undisterted document
it provides an opportunity for a certain methodological purity in which
the interpreter's bias has nething to do with the shape ef the
interview. Te my mind this was an extraerdinary aspect ef these
interviews, for within their framework the pessibilities ef a disciplined
subjectivity in interpretation was much enhanced.
Whatever cavils I have made aside, the importance ef these
interviews is that they represent an aspect ef a total psychehistorical
experience which is accessible, detatchable from the whole, and, hence,
subject to scrutiny. As what fellows will, I believe, reveal, there
was much in this scrutiny.

I
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Survivor Guilt and th* Imagination of Contingency
The survivor syndrome appears to be connected with shared residual
imagery of death; and the ruilt manifest as part of this syndrom* sooms
particularly related to this imagery. The origins of the guilt,
however, do not lie in th* neurotic expression of the syndrom* but
instead are found most clearly in a less well-defined nexus where
the relationship of man’s egocentricity and th* fact of death is
realized—th* sphere *f existential guilt. There the emphasis is on
the moral relatedness of man and his universo, and as such it provides
an important perspective from which t* view a sense of guilt that
surely has its historical roots in a less of connectedness. It
seems to me that certain aspects of th* concentration camp

survivor

guilt can better be understood from this standpoint of ontic or
existential guilt rather than from psychoanalytic epigenetics.
Ontological guilt has three components*
1.

Denial of, and failure to fulfill, one’s potentialities; a guilt

involving the eigenwelt *r one’s "own world.”
2.

The inability t* understand another; this guilt is central t* eur

existence and is part *f the mitwelt-th* world *f eur contemporaneous
human community.
3.

Separation from, and less of connection with, the world of nature;

this involves not only th* Umwelt-the surrounding world,-but th#
Eigenwelt and Mitwelt as well.^
The important point is that all #f us share in this guilt. Where
neurotic guilt has th# possibility, however small, that beyond th*
formation ef a matrix it can be avoided, avoidance #f entelegic
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guilt is by definition an impossibility* Whore neurotic guilt has its
source in the remembrance er expectation of a lex talionls ontological
guilt has its psychohisterical roots in nothing but the existential
condition itself* Essentially ontic guilt is provoked by fear of
dying in an unfulfilled manner which engenders a sense of absolutely
lost connection within the framework of human continuity. Unfaced
ontic guilt may produce neurotic guilt, which serves to impair the
sense of interpersonal awareness and commitment requisite for feeling
existential guilt. ^8 This suggests a mode by which survivor guilt
may be adaptive. The neurotic guilt can serve to help the survivor
avoid confronting the cere of his dilemma: the less of existential
continuity. It is considerably less painful to experience neurotic
guilt than to face the tensions of an entelegically-roeted death imagery,
less of symbolic immortality and a severed sense of connectedness. In
this way neurotic guilt may be an extension of a "closing-off process^
which impairs real efforts toward formulation.
The concept of an ontic guilt derivative of man's relatedness
to his existential condition is corroborated by the anthropological
studies of Robert Redfield.According to him the primitive bears a
"greater burden of guilt than civilized man, for he feels morally
fa
related to the entire universe as well as to his group."DJL Although
Redfield dees net make the distinction it is clear that the guilt to
which he refers is entelegic. Redfield*s supposition, however, Is in
contradistinction to Freud's dicta that with increased civilization
there is increased guilt.^ It is in the resolution of these seemingly
contradictory hypotheses that the distinction between ontic and
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neurotic guilt becomes evident. In terms of a conscious sens# #f
guilt, the kind Redfield refers t*, entelogic guilt contingent upon a
sense #f doatn-defying continuity with the universe is an atavism.
Neurotic guilt has become the greater burden of the modern because
the less of eur natural connection has submerged the conscious
sense of relatedness to the universe that we term "primitive," and
provoked, in a far mere intense fashion, eur fears of death. The
dilemma was clearly adumbrated by Wordsworth I
The world is tee much with us, late and seen
Getting and sponding we lay waste eur powers I
Little we see in nature that is ours
We have given eur hearts away, a sordid been.
The point is this: the kind of guilt we consciously feel has changed*
although both forms are still presont in varying degrees in each of
us; it is the distribution of their expression which has altered.
The concentration camp survivor, however, bears the full burden ef
both forms of guilt. Survival in the camps necessitated a regression
to a mere primitive state and the encounter with death that accompanied
this regression placed the survivor in closer touch with the elemental
death-immortality imagery that is at the cere of the primitivevs
oxistential universe. The experience ef the survivor places him in
a position ef increased contiguity with his entelegic guilt, for
as primitive, in this sense, he is faced with a greater feeling ef
moral relationship to a feared univorse. At the same time, however,
the survivor also bears the guilt ef modern eivilizatien. Ho bears
the burden ef Freud*s "civilized** neurotic guilt by virtue ef the fact
that he is psychologically conditioned by his experience as a modern
who needs to suppress his eneeunter with images ef the primitive
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and the absurd. The survivor’s confrontation with the primitive-beth
in reality and symbolically-may reinforce and exacerbate a heretofore
latent ontolegic enilt, but his psychehisterically determined
modernism, with particular consideration for his ambivalent feelings
surrounding his role in the greatest of modern immoralities, has
given him an even greater share of the neurotic guilt indigenous to
the modern condition.
From this vantage we can perceive the residual imagery of the
concentration camp survivor as multiplex in nature. At its base
level it is a memento mori. a singularly intense reminder of our
mortality. The existential terror engendered by this imagery in turn
gives rise te feelings of guilt as the mode by which one removes his
concerns from death; guilt is able te effect this remeval by several
means.
To feel guilty is a way ef feeling control, even in distant
retrospect, over events. Eriksen sneaks ef existential guilt as inexpli¬
cable when he refers te it as the "tendency on man’s part te feel
that he has caused the face te turn away which happened te turn
elsewhere. *63 To seme extent the maneuvers ef the survivor may give seme
explanation. When a sense ef centre! ever events is lest the
essential fear evoked is that ef death which represents the absolute
less ef our ability to control. By imagining oneself to have caused
our misfortunes we place them within the realm ef punishment, and this
gives the sense that we have caused that which we received (by a
perfectly circular reasoning) thus mitigating eur fears by reaffirming
eur causal role. The mythic paradigm is the expulsion from the Garden

I
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of Eden; it is on® of our earliest efforts to account for tho fact that
we must die and it is made within the context of man’s complicity
in his fate. For tho survivor as well to be guilty is to be in
control, and to be in control is to remain connected to tho possibility
of immortality. This may serve to explain another of the differences
between concentration camp survivors and survivors of other extreme
situations. In the latter group there is often a feeling that an
element of luck was involved in their survival; concentration camp
survivors do not, for the most part, share this feeling, fer luck
implies a sense of happiness over the outcome and, mere importantly,
a loss of control over the possibilities fer survival. As Eugen Kegen
put it: "Chance? Yes - but enly insefar as *luck* is a cempenont ef
persenal ability." ^ The cencentration camp survivor fools he has
made his own luck. Thus he attempts te deny any element ef happiness
ever the outcome and refuses te absolve himself from a self-imposed
liability fer all events that ecurred - including the death ef his
comrades. In essence he assumes an omnipotence fer every aspect ef
the event thus assuring his guilt fer the outcome.
Quilt also serves as a primitive way ef affirming life. The
concentration camp survivor has considerable difficulty in giving
free rein te his emotions, fer in doing so he runs the risk of being
overwhelmed since the crux ef his most important memories revolve
around images of death. Thus fer a survivor in a self-imposed state
ef affective anesthesia to feel guilty is one ef the few avenues ef
feeling that is available. Even if they are excruciatingly painful
they affirm life by being feelings nonetheless. Quilt further removes
death by being a form ef emotive life itself.
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Perhaps the most important aspect in all of this is tho ovent
itself; the psychohisterical actuality ef the concentratien camps
not only lends itself to, but foments, a highly charged guilt imagery.
The dehumanization process was so complete as to blur the distinction
between victim and viotimizer, almost forcing the victim to perceive
himself as accomplice to the event. This blurred distance between
assailant and victim inherent in the residual imagery ef the camp exper
ience allows the survivor to further distort the relationship between
guilt and innocence, motive and result, and to create, by a convoluted
logic, an imagination ef contingency. The survivor assumes a ene-te-ene
organic relationship between the lives ef individuals in the camps
so that every survival is balanced by a death. A connection between
the individual and the fate ef the cemmunity-at-large is also made!
communal destruction is also seen as a consequence ef individual action
The most patently explicit ef this complex ef images in which
death is subsumed by an imagination ef contingency concerns itself
with "guilt over survival priority." Here the perceived causal
connection between

one’s own survival and the resultant death ef a

comrade is made clear. The novelist Jorge Semprun articulates the
beginnings ef the process*
It wouldn’t take much for me to find myself suspect. It
wouldn’t take much for me to tell him its net my fault.
It wouldn’t take much for me to start apologizing for having
survived.
But maybe its £gue, maybe I’m the one who left him, who
abandoned him.
The death imagery that causes this suspicion to become an outright
accusation is to be found in the frequently made connection between
memories ef one's own survival and memories ef ether's deaths*
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I was beginning to weaken. And my friend with whom I had
been together all the time, all these years...was telling
me...You have to hold out, you have stood it so long. Keep
your strength. And meanwhile everyday my best friends wore
dying. My buddies nerished. '
About the others where they were led no one know. Only the
next day we saw the huge flames and the smoke from the
crematory where they wore being burned. And wo went into
the barracks.68
Hannah Bluhm, in her examination of the survivor autobiographies,
has said that for the investigator "death in a Nazi concentration camp
requires no explanation. Survival does."69 The issue is no less problem¬
atic for the survivor who, in the face of the sheer statistical odds
against survival, must determine hew he did it.
I don't know how ^survived, that is hard to conceive hew
people were saved.'
One who survived his wife, child, and brother is asked how he managed
to stay healthy enough to withstand the physical trauma of the camps.
He repliesl
I really don't knew. My brother
of even better health than I.?l

who died

he was possibly

In this reply lies the dilemma ef many survivors* if expected criteria
for survival were ef no value, by what measure ef "luck" did they
survive?

The quest for rational explanations remains elusive.

I don't know today, myself, how the epidemic of spotted
typhus had spared us, because around our barracks...
there were barracks with spotted typhus.?2
The question of the unnaturalness of the deaths is also part of
the survivor's difficulty. These words, by a young survivor who before
being interned in the concentration camps was a member ef the French
underground, make this added dilemma clear*

♦

26
I often wonder why I got out an-* why they remained there.
But one should not talk, it dees not help. Everyone
understands what it does to a persons heart te lose his
parents in such tragic times, because we knew when a person
dies his own death, nothing can be dene. That is a matter
of nature. But when one knows that the parents have gene
into gas that is very hard; it is very hard te bear such
a thought.
There are major issues in the plight of the surviver implicit here.
Survival prierity is clearly breught up* why did _! survive when the
others died? The inability to oxplain the deaths rationally is also
an issue? whan one cannot speak of it, it is because it defies reason
or logical comprehension. This is related to what the survivor feels
is the absolute inriescribability of the experience?
Impossible, to make a picture of it...Words are of no avail.

74

To tell that is the hardest thing for us. Why? Because there
are no words. No way of expressing it that can describe
what happonod from the day when we disembarked frem the
train in the lager Auschwitz.75
When tho experience transcends the realm ef the describable it enters
the domain of tho irrational or a-ratienal. This stems frem a sense ef
inappropriate or mutant death which is not "a matter of nature" and whieh
is impossible t® apprehend and rationalize.
This issue cemes back te the central difficulty ef the survivor,
that of trying to place tho concentration eamps within a framework of
reason? Why did I survive?
Why did I not go together with them? Why did I remain alive?^
Te be unable te answer this question means that the surviver risks
an inevitably self-destructive confrontation with the imagery ef absurd
perforce cheese an alternative imagery. He can begin te find blame
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within himsrlf simply in the fact that ta survive in the perversa
landscape af the cancentration camps was an anamalaus farm af
existenca. Survivors are an overwhelming mindrity and, as with all
minerities, they are treubled by thdir being different and nagged by
the daubt that parhaps thay did da semathing wrong not to have gone
the way of tha many. The value af survival itself must ba censideredi
I was lucky - I say "luckyM because now I have theught it
all over and I see that it has lad, that it was ta tha
goad...''
Evan if tha answer is in tha affirmative tha surviver still wanders
whether in order ta survive ha did semething wrong, ar endured what
humane beings should not. Tha ability ta clasa aff tha envirenment,
ta engage in a psychic numbing, is questioned by tha surviver an
ethical grounds*
... sa thay piled peapla in mounds and peured gas aver them
and burned them over open pyres. One gat accustamed ta such
a sight as if it were semething erdinary. It is terrible ta
say that. And to this day I can’t cancaiva haw I was able ta
bear this stench which weuld not only coma thraugh tha nasa
but would stick ta ane’s palate as if it ware something
palpable; this repugnant pestilential stench that filled
the air. 78
Tha envirenment was an inhuman ana and these who returned fram it
are viewed with suspician. And where survivors are viewed with suspicien
tha dead are seen as dying because af a higher ethical sensibility
that would not sustain

living in such conditions. Tha survivers

may be the lucky ones, but the dead are tha virtuaus.
... the lucky ones; for instance I, remained alive.
Tha strangest, tha mast beautiful have died.79
Viktar Frankl, tha existential psychiatrist (ar Legetherapist as ha
more accurately terms it) wha survived feur different cancantratian
camps, has a similar percept!anI
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there wag a sort of self-selecting process going on the
whole time among all of the priseners. On the average,
only those prisoners could keep alive who, after years ef
trekking from camp te camp, had lost all scruples in their
fight for existence; they wore prepared te use every means,
honest or otherwise, even brutal force, theft and betrayal
of their friends, in order to save themselves. We who have
come back, by the aid ef many lucky chances or miracles whatever one may choose te call them - we knew! the best ef
us did net return. 0
One ef the most dispassionate ef the concentration camp reporters,
Eugen Kegon, similarly apotheosizes the dead at the expense ef the
livings
There were many dead martyrs in the camps but few
living saints.
With a progression from imagery ef absurd death that is recollected
in concert with one's own survival te the perception ef the survivor’s
moral inferiority the step te an imagination ef contingency is a short
one. If the good and the beautiful died there- in complete perversion
ef eur sense of justice - there must have been seme way in which we
contributed te their downfall. Where Frankl and Kegon are quite explicit
in this thought for ether survivors it becomes an implicit matter ef
faith. The following descriptions ef two similar episodes give us
clues te this kind ef psychology:
A let ef women fell into the water and we ... net knowing
it, would kill the drowning ones with eur own feet because
©no was running ever the ether.”2
The second survivor’s description gees a step further in self-blame*
f

She remembers being forced into a barn with several thousand ether
priseners.
When we came out in the morning many comrades remained
behind.
What dees it mean "remained behind?"
We ourselves have trampled them te death. With only., with
eur own feet we have trampled eur brothers te death,
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The sense ef responsibility is present in beth esses; it becemes
unmitigated, however, in the second. There is a sense in the secend
passage ef the victim beceming victimizer which, theugh present in
tho first, is a goed deal mere muted. In a letter received by a
surviver from a friend whe worked in the crematoria this self-blame
assumes grotesque proportions:
I am already transformed into an animal. I have already
gassed my mother. I have already gassed my father; I have
already gassed my sisters and my brethers and the whele
people; the whele Jewish peeple.
Accident and circumstance are rendered irrelevant as the victim
places himself in the rele ef killer.
Frem this pure implication ef self in the death ef others stems
a mere subtle and psychelegically mere useful imaginatien ef ene-teene causality. Jerge Semprun distills the essence ef it:
Each returning de£ertee whe isn’t his sen reduced the
chance that his sen survived, that he’ll see him return
alive. My ewn life, having already returned, increases the
pessibility ef his sen’s death. ®5
The surviver is ne lenger a murderer by any physical actien as was
the case in the preceeding passages. Instead he is a murderer by his
mere intentien te survive. Since there are relatively few survivers whe
might actually feel they murdered the dead in an act ef physical
vielence, it is simply mere tenable te imagine the dead as dying
"in lieu ef" the living, which can still be censidered a causal
relatienship, but is net as self-destructive as "because ef*.’ The
meraery is that ene’s life became a function ef anether prisener’s
fate:
Every prisener was dependent en his fellew priseners,
utterly at their mercy* 86

30
Another survivor remembers an SS man speaking te him immediately
after this same man had shet his clesest friend. He venders
how its possible that a man, a human being can be ne mere
conscious... of having killed semebedy and speaking te some¬
body who was only a chance that its not he^ who has boon
killed, like his comrade.
The question of survival priority is a profoundly personalized one*
Why did he_ die instead of me? As "Credo quia absurdum ost" is untenable
for the survivor who has little support for this kind of transcendental
stance, ho must choose a belief in causality, and that which is most
readily available in his residual imagery appears to bo this imagination
of contingency. The possibilities for assuming this causal role are
expressed by a survivor who had been hiding in an underground bunker
during a deportation raid. Ho had the opportunity to save some other#
being hunted and hero ho explains how ho would have felt had ho not
opened his bunker to a family outside who wore looking for a place
to hide:
I tore open the cover of the bunker. I said to myself,
I den*t want to save myself and have on my conscience six,
six burned offerings - Hungarian Jews.
Had ho not saved thorn it would have boon his fault; ho sees their
lives as contingent upon his action. The expression burnt offering is
noteworthy in this regard. It will be discussed at greater length with
the imagery of women and children, but suffice it to say hero that it
is the language of sacrifice and it implies that the dead would have
been sacrificed for the sake of the survivor.
The ultimate guilt imago is that of one being killed or taken
away in lieu of another 8
From the start people wore under the impression that they
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will look only for men. They would hide and leave the women
and children... Yes they would hide and leave at heme the
children and wives. So they took the women and children. ®9
There are refinements on this perception as well. The apotheosis of
the dead leads to the belief that they willfully surrendered thomsolvos
to the system, and by this act saved the others.
... seeing that there was no way of saving oneself
people simply surrendered so that death may come sooner
because to live in such a manner was worse than death. u
Many have also sought death. They ceuldn’t look at that
and endure all the ways in which we were tortured. 91
The dead rather than remembered as the weaker for being unable to
sustain the brutality are the stronger in terms of their heightened
sensitivity to inhumanity.
Just as the dead sacrificed themselves, so the living are seen,
in some way, as abandoning the dead. A survivor, who we might note
was already pregnant ten months after liberation, recalls vividly her
attempt te save a child from the gas chamber. The SS man whem she asks
te spare the child te Lis her
If you want to go to tho crematory you can go with the child*
And if not go away from the child. I could accomplish nothing
.... I cried very much... And I parted from the child and left.92
This same woman remembers that
The struggle fer life was strenger than anything. I left
my brother on the road. I do not knew what happened te
his bones. 93
In both memories there is a sense of abandoning the dead In order te
improve one’s own chance for survival. It is noteworthy that in the
secend passage she makes no real mention of the fact that her brether
was already dead when she left his bedy at the roadside. The sense ef
sacrificing one life fer another is present in both passages - even
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if the sacrifice is viewed as a realistically useless gesture as in
the first passage er benign abandemient as in the secend. With the
sense of benign abandonment there is eften a sense ef failed comrade¬
ship in which it is felt that a mere forceful act might have saved the
dead. Where abandonment is usually by pure passivity failed comradeship
is felt to involve seme constructive action, but net enough to be
meaningful.
There we had to abandon two of eur comrades who were weak®
We wanted to take them with us ... but they said these
people will come in the automobiles. And so they are •'coming'®
to this very day. 9^
The survivor's feeling is that seme small measure of protest er
protection for the weak would have been enough to save them, but even
this small measure could net be attained, and their impotence leads
them to a further sense ef fault, ef guilt.
All ef these variations on the theme ef contingency strengthen
the feeling ef guilt. One is guilty net only by his inaction, but by
a sense ef ethical inferiority and a debt ef gratitude which can never
be repayed. (And as we knew unpaid debts are a prime source ef hate.)

These elements, beginning with the basic fear ef death and the
existential need to feel a sense ef mastery ever one's fate as well
as to explain one's anomalous survival in an environment that defied
descriptien, impel the survivor to find seme equatien whereby the
calculus ef his existence can be defined. The disterted relationships
between assailant and victim inherent in this system which forced its
victims to become psychological accomplices - by their desire to

33
survive - reinforces the survivor's effort to establish a dynamic
equilibrium in which every change on the side of survival is balanced
by an equal change on the side of death.
Much of the imagery te fellow is concerned with issues of survival
priority and are themselves, though frequently significant divergences,
variations, nonetheless on a theme of ene-fer-ene contingency. The
artificial distinctions I have made between varying aspects of this
theme have been created fer the sake ef the clarity gained in examining
the individual components ef this admixture.
The pure imagery ef survivor guilt and the alleys that fellew
provide a principle by which the survivor attempts te master the
imagery ef death. But we ought te bear in mind, as the manifestations
ef the survivor syndrome attest and as Elio Wiosel, a survivor ef
Ausehvitz and Buchenwald, articulates:
Te defeat death, te defeat it by accident, against one's
wish, is neither victory nor blessing.

Selections
The "selections” were precisely that which they were called:
roll-calls ef the prisoners during which the decisions ef who would
live and who would die were made. It was common knowledge among the
prisoners that they were divided into three groups: these able te
work - they livedj cases of questionable work value - their survival
depended on the priorities ef that particular time, whether extermination
or slave labor was deemed mere important; finally, the eld and the
young - they were considered ef no value and were sent te the gas

*

chambers immediately. Selectiens began upen arrival in the camps, and
the prisoners were already aware ef their significance.
We were fortunate te be assigned te the left side and
it was said that w© are still going te the lager, there
is hope fer us te live. 96
The SS man stood there eating candy bonbons. And with the
bonbon in his mouth, he pointed, this one te the right,
this one te the left. And what that meant - we knew already.9?
Those who might net have realized what was happening found out very
early, very explicitely. This young survivor remembers the announcement
ef an SS officer immediately before the selection began*

Continuing throughout the operation ef the camps the frequency ef
the selections varied with the changing priorities. The memories ef them
are filled with images ef death and guilt. Fears ef death were apparent.
Prisoners know that te be sent te the wrong side meant an irrevocable
death sentence, thus many ef their images ef death are pictured in
terms ef which side one was selected fer.
There burned a huge fire. This was the fire ef these who
had te go te the right. 99
This memory is a retrospective one both visually and spatially; the
psychological distance between symbol and meaning is what is remembered.
ether survivors recall their prospective fears waiting fer themselves
or their families te be picked fer the gas chambers.
And sure enough the mother was immediately assigned te
group three which meant the worst.
Whether one remembers being psychologically near or distant the image
is the same - fear ef death, often accompanied by a sense ef absolute
impotence evoked by the inability te de something that might alter the
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outcome of the selection.
... it was known that Saturday... Sunday morning he will
bo sent to the gas chamber but unfortunately I could net
find a way, I could do no more than weeping or wailing. I
had to look on not only when my brother, but all my friends,
all my comrades, relatives, female ceusins, male cousins, te
look on, how they wore sent away there and then.
Not only are the death images fear-engendering, but the feeling ef
impotence further serves te evoke fears of dying by forcing the survivor
te come te grips with his inability te control his own life and death*
Again the survivor makes his painful choice. Rather than focus
on this imagery and its implications he attempts te recall ether
apects ef the selections which provide images that in seme way will
alleviate the sense ef existential pewerlessness and hence, the fear
ef dying. But we are existentially powerless and the concentration camp
survivor knows this better than anyone,

so what he needs is an imagery

that will help him avoid being reminded ef the fact. He can find these
particularly easily in memories ef the selections because they contain
olements ef contingency in a palpable form. As with survival priority,
by assuming a sense ef guilt he give himself an artifice ef power
enabling him to forget the impotence and death fear that is inherent
in the actual circumstances of the selections. The system ef the
selections,however, also provides the alternate imagery. The SS
occasionally gave prisoners wcentrelM ever killing their comrades. In
one camp a prisoner was called upon te select twenty-five people for
the gas chamber. If he refused the SS would send seventy-five ef their
choice instead. The dilemma is well-remembered8
The prisoner, he could save the lives ef seventy-five
people. By doing this selection. &it he would be the
murderer ef twenty-five. 1 ^

\
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Simon Wiesenthal , in his memoir The Murderers Among Us, recounts a
similar story:
I once talkod with a Jewish concentration camp trusty who
saved his life by taking part in the execution of a follow
Jew* The devilish SS man told him it was either ho or the
other man. 103
The survivor*s sons© of one life traded for another, then, can havo
its origins in a real event, though fer most survivors the part they
played in this reality was little other than receiver of a story or,
closer to the event, a helploss witness. Yet they feel that they tee,
though in exceedingly mere subtle ways, willed

the destruction of the

ether. Their guilt feelings about their thoughts are as harsh as the
criticism of deeds. Wiesenthal continues:
The trusty’s defense was that if he hadn't done it somebody
else might havo shot the Jew, and he would have died tee. I
don't accept this: murder is murder ne matter who commits
it.
104
There is ne way out fer this survivor who in an exaggerated fashion
symbolizes the plight of all survivors. Thought becomes equated with
action, and to have wished the death of another » as inevitably happ¬
ened in this situation - is felt as being the equivalent of having
collaborated in that ether's death. One also feels guilty ever having
wished the death of another, and, as Bettelheim points out, this is
a major focus fer guilt feelings.
The argument that the biological urge fer survival precluded
moral responsibility is unacceptable, fer the survivor feels that any
ethical lapse is inexcusable. This is particularly s® when the dead
are remembered as sacrifices fer their survival. The following excerpt
exemplifies this memory of ene-fer-ene balance inherent in the selections 8
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I pleaded with him that he should set the little boy free
that he wasn’t yet fourteen years old only thirteen... Ho
is still a child... But the doctor said: Sine* I have set
one free, I cannot set free the other. And wo had to agree.^05
A case history reported by Ruth Jaffe demonstrates dissociative phenom¬
ena having their origin in the guilt imagery of the selections. I quote
from her report:
Katy was twenty-four years old when the war broke out.
During psychiatric examination she suddenly turned her
head, rose, bowed, made searching movements with her head,
covered her eyes with her hand, as if to see better into the
distance, talked to herself, and burst into laughter which
resembled crying... After some minutes she regained composure
and related that she had heard her sister’s voice. Exploration
in narcoanalysis revealed that this pantomimic scene is an
almost exact repetition of a traumatic situation which sho
had gone through at her arrival at the railway station of the
Auschwitz concentration camp. She had arrived there with her
eight-year eld sen and her yeunger sister who was the boy's
maid. After the journey of several days she had got out
exhausted and dazed. When recovering after the first minutes
of perplexity and confusion sho saw two columns ®f people
leaving the station in different directions, one consisting
of the eld and ef mothers with children, and the other ono
of young men and wemen. She understood from previous ex¬
periences that this was a "selection” and that the first
column was destined for death. Suddenly she realized that
already at a distance her sen and her sister walked in this
column. Before she could run after them and take her sister's
place in order to save her, she was kicked into the second
column of those selected for work. She could hear her sister
calling "Katy where are you? Why do you leave me?"
106
Jaffe sees her attacks as repetitions of this scene, and notes the
profound sense ef sacrifice in the memory ef it.
She is obsessed by guilt at having sacrificed her sister
in order to stay alive and vainly tries to cenvinc© hersolf that she was not capable in her confusion ef orienting
herself mere quickly. 10/
The recollection of the selections seem t® provide two alternative images.
The fear ef death, however,

is no real choice. What the survivor dees

is te pick up the subtile threads ef an imaginary guilt and weave them
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into a curtain of guilt which shields him from far moro dangerous
fears.

Resistance and Blurred Complicity
The issue ef resistance is a highly volatile one, but the question
ef why the prisoners did er did net resist cannot be taken up here. It
enters into the subject ef survivor guilt only insofar as the question
plagues many ef the survivors and the imagery connected to it is
another from which guilt stems.
One ef the best examples ef the potency of this residual imagery
came in the mid-Sixties with the publication ef Hannah Arendt*s
Eichmann in Jerusalem. Essentially the book was concerned with what the
subtitle termed "the banality ef evil” , and the failure of the Israeli
courts to transcend, what Miss Arendt considered, parochial matters and
establish a universal definition ef, and approach to, "erimes against
\

humanity." In making her arguments to this effect Arendt gratuitously
stated ( the point was net particularly relevant to the thrust ef the
book ) that
...this role ef Jewish leaders in the destruction ef their
own people is undoubtedly the darkest chapter in the whole
dark stery. ^®8
Stemming in large part frem this sentence a heated and often virulent
debate ensued in the intellectual and scholarly communities. The
rather vituperative nature ef many ef the arguments indicated mere,

I think, than mere intellectual gymnastics er pure scholarly polemics.
The issue was a sensitive one for many survivors prior to this

39
debate. Almest immediately after their liberatien they were plagued
with questions ef why they did net resist. In speaking ef members ef
the French resistance, the Maquis, this surviver indicates her sensit¬
ivity te the matter:
I emphasize sixty Jewish women, sixty Jewish girls because
it is being said that the Jews have werked fer the GermanSo
It is being said that the Jews were hiding and that the
Jews did nething. HO
With this emphasis en these whe actively resisted are implicit
accusatiens against these whe did net; the fellewing passage has this
mere openly:
Among this group whe were fighting, whe took chancos with
their lives, were significantly less casualties than among
the Jews whe were hiding or were sitting with their hands
crossed waiting te be arrested. HI
The accusation comes te this: by failure te resist one becomes, in effect,
an accomplice te his own and his comrade*s destruction. That this may
be true is a possibility that nags at the surviver each time he remem¬
bers an event in which he felt particularly powerless. And the memories
ef his impotence which connect with the deaths ef his friends evoke fan¬
tasies that perhaps things might have been otherwise had he acted.
The failure te resist was recognized as a way ef clinging te
survival, yet, paradoxically, it meant an almest sure death net te;
and it meant death te act as well. The imagery ef death-if-yeu-de
or if-yeu-den*t that is connected with issues ef resistance may explain
the vacillation between defensiveness concerning the inability te resist
and the exultation when speaking ef these whe did. This excerpt is
fairly typicals
Once the Christian block trusty reproached me: "Why are
they going with such indifference te death? Why don't they
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fight? Why don't they kill somebody?” So I replied ”You
haven't been in a ghotte. You have not seen how Jews went
away in transports with congealed nerves. A human being
can cry himself dry; a human being clings to life and up
to the last moment there is a ray of hop* and they are
defensoloss. And they have no arms... And th# same day a
miracle happened. The Jews siezed the oven... And I thought
then maybe we shall still survive.
Resistance for most meant death; yet as a meaningful death it was
preferable :
I in part assisted in this revolt in Auschwitz which was
for all of us a satisfaction to know that if w® shall have
to die, we will know, that as far as it was possible for us
we have obstructed the werk of extermination.
What this survivor is saying stands as an accusation which those who did
not resist have te centend with: for seme ef us the ethical impulse
superceded the biological urge to survive.The pride with which steries
of resistance are told, even, as in the following case, where the form
ef rebellion was suicide, are in marked contrast te the shame felt by
mest survivers fer their failure te act. A girl abeut te be hanged is
remembered with particular esteems
... she was cutting up her arteries because she did not
want to go to her death... by their hands, but that she
wanted te die her own death.
These whe did net resist, then, cannet even call their deaths their
ewn. Survival is held specieus because of the survivor8s failure to
avail himself of the possibility ef a noble death. And the dead wh# died
witheut resisting are also tainted with this mark of impurity.
With these harshly ambivalent memories of death and the dead
inherent in the images ef resistance ceme questions ef fault. By net
having resisted one becemes, effectively, part accomplice. There is ne
neutral pesitien: ene is either rebel er eellaberater in a blurred
visien which perceives enly distant ends ef the spectrum. Theugh there
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were actual collaborators who are blamed the surviver sees himself as
having gone aleng with them - whether wittingly er unwittingly dees net
matter.
...account of Menok Merin and his crew. He lulled us inte
such a state of sleep we didn’t think, we didn’t consider
the possibility of resistance. H5
The surviver psychologically transforms his passivity inte a perception
of collaboration by default. The feeling that n I tee might have
resisted” has its obverse in ** I tee might have been an accomplice.*8
I put myself inte his situation. I imagine what would
I have done if I had been in his place? ... Today one
can say if one does net want to be truthful * Yes, I defi¬
nitely would have refused.* But one can never be sure that
if it would come to it, that one would simply have replied
8 I don’t want to do it.8 Because a human being is only a
human being.
Since the memory of non-resistance most frequently revolves around
memories of ether's deaths and, hence, one’s fears of dying, the sur¬
viver cannot afford to view the image objectively. Rather he distorts
the perception of himself in the event and the event as a whole,
eliminating any mitigating circumstances. The very valid reasons why
he may have been unable to resist er why, as it was in most cases, it
may have been utterly futile to have dene so, are conveniently dispensed
with as the surviver becomes plagued with the thought that he might
have dene mere te save himself and his fellew-prisoners. Instead of
remembering his real impotence and fears of being killed when the imagery
of resistance is reawakened he perceives it as a guilt-laden challenge.
A seng emerging frem the concentration camps , Es Brent ( It &irns)p
centains this challenge:
If your life is dear te you.
Take the buckets and quench the fire.

■r
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Quench it with your own bleed1
Provo that you can do it.
Don’t stand brothers looking on
With folded armsl
Take the buckets and put out the fire
Because our village burns 1
The perception is that these who did net resist steed "looking on with
folded arms" when they had the opportunity to do something. The sur¬
vivor confronts himself with this blurred vision of complicity for
ho intuits it far safer to fool guilty than to be paralyzed by fear.

Shared Terror
To this point wo have spoken of an imagery of lives in organic
continuity purely on an individual-te-individual basis. There is,
however, another form of this imagination of contingency that is part
of the psychic residuum of the survivor. I refer to a sense of communal
interdependence in which the surviver perceives his actiens as having
an effect not only on individuals but on the fate of the cemmunity-atlarge; and at the same time his fate is seen as reciprocal with the
actions of the community. This theme may be unique te the concentration
camp survivor, and it may be particularly pronounced in the Eastern
European Jewish survivors, stemming, as I see it, from that specific
cultural milieu and its singular sense of communal interdependence.
The ideological origins of this stress on communal responsibility
may bo found with the biblical answer to Abel’s " Am I my brother’s
keeper?" to which the reply has always been a firm "Yes." The Prophets
in turn made a sense of community part of the national ethical impulse.

But only the exigencies of historical circumstance provided the
impetus whereby individual responsibility for communal events reached
its most complete form. The isolation of the Jew and his shtetl. or
ghetto-village, necessitated,

on pragmatic grounds, a communal con¬

sciousness in which caring for the poor and the stranger was in harmony
with the theocratic demands of the religious heritage. One*s relatives
were of the utmost concern, and in an extended kinship system where
the most obscure and distant relationships are searched for and con¬
sidered valuable the "relatives" may have included most of the village;
when there was no bleed relationship to be established the dictum "All
Israel are brothers" elevates them to the level of family anyway.
This sense of communal responsibility is felt net only in the
realm of charity but in the area of individual action as well. To sin
in public, for example,

is far worse than to commit the same indiscre¬

tion in private for it may also mislead ethers. If one is known te have
committed some ethical or legal indiscretion it is incumbent upon
members of the community te make the transgressor aware ef what he has
dene, te deter him from recidivism in the future, and te remind him
that individual actions have communal implications in the eyes ef both
God and man.^®
This last is the key points individual actions have communal
implications. The biblical pattern is again instructive. In the des¬
truction ef Sodom God offers te save the city if Abraham can find fifty
righteous people in it. Later, as In the prophet Jeremiah, the nation
is collectively punished because its individual members "hearkened net
nor inclined their ear te turn from their wickedness." ^9

This

tradition ef community punishment for individual and mass sin extended
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dorp into the life ef the shtotl; it provided the rationale fer
persevering pogroms and the continued oppression that was their
historical let.
With this legacy we can readily see hew the concentration camp
survivors, many ef whom were from Eastern European origins and imbued
with this comiiunitas. might have a good deal ef their residual imagery
revolving around issues of communal responsibility. This sense is
explicitized by Chaim Kaplan's description of the Warsaw Ghettot
Everyone has come to realize that he is an organic part
of a whole body. Anything good fer the whole body is good
for him, and the reverse... The concept that "all Jews are
responsible for one another” has stepped being merely a
slogan or metaphor. It is realized in us. 120
This is markedly distinct from the experience ef extreme situation
survivors in whom the initial response was an illusion ef centrality,
a feeling that "I alone am affected." 121

This, however, seems to me

to be a function ef actual aleneness, or ef disasters ef sudden impact
fer which there was no preparation.The first reason is given credence
by the finding in mine cave-ins where groups ef men were trapped together
there never seems to be this perception ef aleneness.

122

When one sees

his fellow victim, no matter what type ef disaster, the illusion ef
centrality disappears, but oven when no longer present it is never
replaced by a sense ef communal suffering. The concentration camp
survivor,on the ether hand, never has an illusion ef centrality. His
perception is always one ef the com minity being threatened by and resp¬
onding to the disaster in a shared way.
Seme ef this realization was pleasant fer the community meant
respite, as it had throughout Jewish history, from the brutal realities
ef oppressions

V
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The reception given to us by Jews in Poland aftor deportation
thero who had been informed, was so warm and marvelous, that
for a moment one was able zo forget the pain, the misery and
the want... The people sacrificed evory thing. 1^3
In the camps tliis communal liability had practical implications for sur¬
vival I
There were unfortunatcly such people who fell in disfavor
to the great gentlemen the SS and they beat them constantly,
do wg agreed among us that we shall go with a proposal that
daily ten men would report for beatings to soothe their bes¬
tial instincts and to request that in a lager of seven
hundred people that en every seventieth day each ene would
be beaten and not te boat day in and day out the same
^^
poople with the result that they were being boaten to death.
The pleasantries however, are the exception rather than the rule. For
the mest part it is the communally shared horrors that are remembered.
Survivors not only remember their ewn terror, but in a way that seems
singular t® this experience they remember feeling, together with their
individual fears, a sense of communal despair,

of shared terror.

I don’t want to talk about what they have dene te me, I
want to talk about what they have done te all of us.
We started to wail and scream. The screams were rising
te hoaven. It became like a choir.
In this last passage there is a hint ef connection with a community be¬
yond the contemporary. "Screams rising te heaven" suggests identifica¬
tion with a historical community as they are perceived residing in
heaven and as fellow sufferers, as well as a form of supplication te
the divinity. This becomes mere clear in the following brief description
of the first days ef internment at a French deportation camp*
Every time a woman or a child would raise their
voice crying the whole Veledrom, as many as thore
were, could cry with them. The destruction of the
temple! 127
Reference to the Temple is indicative ef a sense ef connection with a
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biblical cemmunity af victims that has represented the histarical
fate of the Jaw far same twa thausand years. From the liturgical
literature ta the commonplace idiomatic expression every tragedy
that has befallen the community is placed within the context af the
greatest of tragedies - the destruction af the Temple of Solomon.
Elia Wiesel's recant naval, A Beggar in Jerusalem, characterizes the
significance of the Temple and its geographic location Jerusalem.
A name; a secret. For the exiled a prayer. For all
others, a promise. Jerusalem! seventeen times destroyed
yet never erased. The symbol of survival. 128
This has significant uses as a defense against threats to one's real
and symbolic life. To be firmly rooted in a continuing historical
process, even if it is one where the role is that of victim, is to be
part of an immortalizing process. What the survivor feels is that being
a link in an unbroken chain of sufferers insures one’s ultimate survival!
just as Jerusalem has survived repeated ravishings so tee will the
people of Israel survive, even this catastrephe. Being part of this
cemmunity that has shewn a gift for survival can be a mode ef achieving
a sense ef immortality, and being part ef a victimized cemmunity dees
a geed deal te assuage one’s guilt by reminding him that his is a
histerical role ef victim rather than assailant, and that he has always
been a sufferer rather than a victimizer.
This is a double-edged swerd however, for in the histerical context
the community is always seen as suffering for its sins. Thus te identify
with the cemmunity as victim also entails assumption ef role as one who
has traditionally brought misfortune down on himself. The histerical
context this time festers the maneuvers by which the victims become
causal agents. The '’Chosen People" has incumbent upon it a higher
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moral responsibility, which if not fulfilled will brine; down the wrath
of God.Again, via a devious, but nonetheless psychologically real, reute,
guilt gives eno the ability to place his misfortunes in a rational con¬
text. Within the concentration camps the negative image of a brutal
Jew gives each survivor an epitome of his own possiblo guilt by compli¬
city or by failure of communal responsibility.
The Jewish militia of the ghettos and the "block elders" or
"capos" in the camps are the major sources of this negative Imagery.
Tne contrast between the German gentile and what is expected of the
Jew marks these collaborating Jews as deviants?
The Germans, well I can’t expect anything from them..
One Jew wants to do that to another. That is something
horrible. ^9
These were individuals whose behavior was completely alien to the expecta¬
tions and the norm of the shtetlS
... a Jewish capo. But that torments a person. It makes
one a revolutionary. Here is a Jew and he beats me. He
is the same as I am, but because he has more to eat and
because he is no longer in the lager he behaves that way...
It does something to a person...And to my great regret I
also have to toll you, it is true, and I am still ashamed
that I have to tell such a thing, but it is the pure truth. ^
With this sense of shame is a sense of guilt over failed responsibility
in net having deterred one who is "the same as I am" fre» becoming an
accomplice. Net only did rare individuals fail to live up to the ethical
ideal but
a Jowish lager; one was only under Jews and still one was
ready to kill the ether for a little bread, just so out
of irritation, the other fellow was net considered a human
being
The entire community, even though placed in extreme and extenuating
circumstances, is felt to be guilty of becoming the same as the oppressors.
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Even if their actions were infinitesimal in relation to their persecuters
and understandable under the circumstances the meral lapse is
inexcusable and places them in the same category as the SS. In this
landscape of ethical absolutes magnitude ef action is not recognized,
only purity ef intention is reckoned. Se where the distinction between
assailant and victim diminishes, the survivor, by neither deterring
his neighbor or being absolutely blameless in his own mind, perceives
himself as contributing to the downfall ef his friends and his entire
people. In essence he can only see himself having dene this to insure
his own survival. The language of a Lithuanian survivor who had been in
the camps as a twenty-year old indicates this feelingJ the Jewish militia
in the moment when their own lives were in peril they
preferred to beat kapores the^ljves ef ether Jews se
that they could remain alive
'
The language, like that ef'burnt offerings," implies sacrifice. Beating
kapores is a ritual that was carried out the morning preceding the
Day of Atonement in which a hen or reester is sacrificed in lieu ef
one's sins for the year. In the words of the survivor this reflects the
feeling that one sacrificed the life ef another in order to survive.
Each survivor maintains this imagery of communal responsibility in
which individuals and the community as a whole is in seme way at fault
for allowing or being accomplice to the sacrifice.
The temptation to place blame on a few aberrant individuals cannot
b© succumbed to because "he is the same as I am."; the sense of total
communal interconnection disallows this way ef freeing oneself from
a shared guilt. Individual responsibility is seen as always having its
origin in communal responsibility, and an individual action is seen as
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a possibility for every member of the group, and in seme ways a
reflection of the group animus.
The concentration camp atmosphere was one in which individual
action could only be a negation of the sense of community. Prime
Levi, author of Survival in Auschwitz, speaks of the contrast!
before the camps
I had net yet been taught the doctrine that I was later
to learn so hurriedly in the lager: that man is bound to
pursue his own ends by all possible means... 1-33
But in the lager things are different: here the struggle
to survive is without respite, because everyone is desper¬
ately and ferociously alone. If seme Null Achtzen vacillated,
he will find no one to extend a helping hand; on the contrary
someone will knock him aside, because it is in no one’s
interest that there be one more "musselman” dragging himself
to work every day; and if sorneome, by a miracle of savage
patience and cunning, finds a new method of avoiding the
hardest work, a new art which yields him an ounce of bread,
he \-dll try to keep his method secret, and he will be esteemed
and respected for this, and will derive from it an exclusive
personal benefit; he will become stronger and so will be
feared, and. who is feared is, ipse facte, a candidate for
survival. 5
One’s chances for survival were improved by a self-centered renunciation
of everything but self-seeking. So for those who survived the note of
discord remains: we are of the same skin, what is there to say I would
note have done the same if given the opportunity;

and more plaguing, I

did survive-that in itself is proof that I did do the same, for survival,
by definition, is impure by the fact that it means livi ng beyond another’s
death0 The whole experience may be apprehended in communal terms: the
survivor has suffered with, shared and renounced ties to, and lived
beyond his community. In each aspect of the experience the central fact
is that of death, and although the imagery of community serves as a
historically-derived base for examination of group culpability it also

'
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sets the stage for the individual survivor, as part of this blameworthy
community, to be cencerned that perhaps he teo beat kapores with the
lives of the dead.

Mutant Death and the Sins of the Fathers
The death of children and, te a lesser degree, women presents a
profoundly painful series ef images for the surviver te deal with.
Nearly every survivor has retained memories ef children dying.
(What is the most terrible story you remember from the
concentration camp?J
It was when we came to Birkenau and they took the children
with the women and they started te threw them in the fire. ^
the children... they experienced the worst. They were si
murdered. They were exterminated. Net like human beings.
Never shall I forget the little flames ef the children,
whose bodies I saw turned into wreaths of smoke beneath
a silent sky. Never shall I forget these flames which
consumed my faith forever..
There are a number ef themes here which give particular intensity to the
images ef dying children. The issues ef symbolic immortality and mutant
death are particularly important. Liften speaks ef symbolic immortality as*
Man’s need, in the face of inevitable biological death,
to maintain an inner sense of continuity with what has
gone on before and what will go on after his own indivi¬
dual existence. From this point of view the sense of im¬
mortality is much more than a mere denial of death; it is
part ef a compelling, life-enhancing imagery binding each
individual person te significant groups and events removed
from him in place and time. It is the individual’s inner
perception ef his involvement in what we call the historical
process. The sense of immortality may be expressed bielegically by living en threugh (er in) one’s sons and daughters;
theelegically in the idea ef a life after death er ether forms
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of spiritual conquest of death; creatively, or through
"works" and influences persisting beyond biologic death;
through identification with nature, and with its infinite
extension into timo and space; or oxporientially, through
a foeling-state - that of experiential transcendence - se
intense that at least temporarily it eliminates time and
death. 138
Herein lies the critical point for understanding the heightened intensity
of mourning where less is felt as being out of the natural order, in¬
volving a child or mother,

or simply being unexpected. In all cases

the sense of organic continuity is lost, and with this less cernes the
dissolution of man* s sense of symbolic immortality.Erikson describes
this feeling (under another name) with exquisite clarity:
an ego-chill, a shudder which comes from the sudden
awareness that our non-existence - and thus our utter
dependence on a creator who may choose to be impolite is entirely possible. Ordinarily we feel this shudder
only in moments when a shock forces us to step back from
ourselves, and we do not have the necossary time or
equipment to recover instantaneously a position from
which to view ourselves again as persistent units subject
to our own logical operations. Where man cannot establish
himself as the thinking one ( who therefore is), ho may
experience a sense of panic; which is at the bottom of our
mythmaking, our metaphysical speculation, and our artificial
creation of "ideal" realities in which we become and remain
the central reality. 139
An ego-chill - this is the essence of it. In witnessing death the sense
ef connection is lost and it terrifies, for it brings us the specter
of eur own mortality. The poet’s insight is most astute:
And yet you will woep and know why...
Nor mouth had, no nor mind, expressed
What heart heard of, ghost guessed l
It is the blight man was born for.
It is Margaret you mourn for. 1^
A correlate of the lost immortality-fear ef death motif is the
concept of appropriate death - the feeling that death has come in its
proper time and place. Although the original papers ef Weisman and

V
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Hackett

dealt with feelings about death of self their parameters

are equally useful in delineating attitudes toward death in general, beth
ef self and ether. The sense ef appropriate death requires reduced
conflict, compatibility with an ego ideal, the fooling that important
relationships will be restored by death, and that death will bring
about tho consummation of a wish. It can be seen that each of these
categories has inherent a sense of completeness and centinuity. If a
mourner feels that the deceased "appropriately'8 died, that their
lives were complete, that the dead had found their niche within a
historical superstructure, then mourning can proceed relatively
unhindered. When we speak of one’s life as a "closed book" this is what
we m-an. To take it a step further, if the potential for appropriateness
is seen this tee makes mourning mare peaceful. Te restate it from the
obverse side: it is only when death is seen as senseless, as totally
unpredictable, as the premature termination ef an incomplete life
are our symbolic defenses broken down. Each ef these categories is
important.senseless-boyond what we know as the natural order;
unpredictable-death operant in what seems a sudden historical vacuum
provokes our worst fears; premature and incomplete-a function ef the
first two and itself the antithesis ef eur basic hopes from life,
maturity and completeness* In a word it is mutant death which evokes
eur fear ef the absurd, ef eur non-existence*
The death of children epitomizes all of the negative aspects
of symbolic immortality, and is the prime example of mutant death*
The death ef a child interrupts the natural order and flew ef generations;
this is mere threatening to one’s sense of symbolic immortality than
the death ef a contemporary because it is a disruption and cessation
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of the living example of one’s persistence beyond the biological
self. Immortality through one’s children is the most palpable mode
available and is probably the most important component of the entire
symbology that projects us beyond death. It follows from this that
bereavement over the death of a child is the most distressing and
long-lasting, for it requires greater reconstructive work on a
fractured symbology.

142

There is also evidence,

shown primarily in

childhood, but I think valid throughout life, that loss of the mother
provokes more intense grief than loss of the father.That this is
the case, I believe, is because, as R. J. Liften has peinted out
in a different context, "the focus from which woman’s psychological
life emanates - is close identification with organic life and its
perpetuation.Not only does the woman horsolf have this perception,
but she is equally perceived by others from the aspect of her
"motherliness." Women, just as children, are, respectively, the repesitery
and incarnatien of symbolic immortality. This emphasis on metherliness
is noteworthy in the language of the survivers whe frequently refer
*

net to women but to mothers.

♦The eld are also part of this general imagery of innocence in that
they are felt in their old age to have grown wise beyond sin. This is
expressed in lines from Nelly Sach’s mysteriously beautiful peem "Even
the eld men's last breath:"
Even the ©Id men's last breath
That had already grazed death
You snatched away
You thieves of genuine hours of death.
Last breaths and the eyelids' Good Night
Of one thing bo sure!
The angel, it gathers

5^
The death of achild in the concentration camp is not only out
of the natural order but it represents a total dislocation from tho
natural setting as well.

Death in the concentration camp

cannot be compared with a case wh^n a child, dies, is
sick and dies in its own bed.
In this sense of dislocation, that even a child dies away from home,
the connection with communal survival is evidenced. In most cultures
the child symbolizes the future survival ef the culture. Thus, the
image of the child goes beyond individual immortality to include in it
tho survival of the community. For European Jews this was no less the
case:
The child murdered in sleep
Arisos; bends down the tree ef ages
And pins tho white breathing star
That was once called Israel
To its topmost bough.
Spring upright again, says tho child,
To where tears mean eternity
whimpering of little children in little smoke
mother’s cradle songs in smoke
.
Israel's way of freedom in smoke- 0
In both excerpts the child is the means by which the natien gains or
loses its immortality. This being the case, the child was protected above
all else. This is a common recollection*
Father told him: "'For the sa^e
He himself remained there.

the children, ge#w

What you discarded
From tho old men’s premature midnight
A wind of last broaths shall arise
And drive this unloosed .star
Into the Lord’s handsi * *
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This protection was extended even to death!
When the children were found many mothers wanted to go
with the children together because it was announced that
the children will be shot. 150
A mother who was burned alive is remembered as calling out from tho flames!
My child stay alive. I 'will watch over you.
I will keep you in my hand. 151
Tho following survivor who had be»n through Auschwitz and its neighborcamp 3irk~nau, the sole survivor of his entire family, and saw thoro
what he believed to be the annihilation of the Jewish peoplo was moved
to Terozin (Theresienstadt) just prior to liberation. There ho saw
Jews well-dressed, little children...Children tho kind
wo had not seen for two years. Childron like tho which
we have seen ourselves, how they were burned in the
crematories, so now we could not believe these wore
Jewish children. 5
For him survival of his people is difficult to believe and it is
crystallized in his reaction to seeing the childron. A directress
of an orphanage for displaced childron, most of whom had boon in
concentration camps, and who herself was a survivor, makes apparent
tho significance of a group of children who had been hidden in monasteries
during t^e war and had nearly died

thore(the monasteries wore virtually

under sioge at th^t time) and who wore nursed back to health under her
care i
Those children are as if they belonged to us. They belong
to the entire Jewish people. I believe that their place is
in Palestine. 153
The children are felt to be part of the entire community, and as symbols
of communal survival they are to be sent to the place that is symbolic of
tho national aspiration for continuity.
It is clear, I think, how tho images of children symbolize on two

)
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levels the sense of immortality, as representatives ef communal
survival, and the coherence of the natural order. This is why the
imagery of dying children is so profoundly engraved in the memory
of the survivor. It is an accurate psychological response that in
Semprun's novel The Long Voyage the death of children is the central
and most moving image. It serves as the raison d*etre ef the work:
And maybe I shall be able to tell about the death of the
Jewish children, describe that death in all its details,
solely in the hope - perhaps exaggerated, perhaps unroalizeable - that these children may hear it... The story .
of the Jewish children in the name ef the Jewish children.1-5
Aside from its intimate connection with lest immortality and
death fears we are horror-struck at tho death ef a child because ef
a tradition which believes in tho innocence ef tho child. For the
survivor as well
The death ef a man is only the death ef a man, but the
death of a child is the death of innocence, the death of
God in the heart ef man. ^-55
Since the child is himself innocent there must be another reason for
his mutant death aside from personal guilt. The challenge posed by the
poet Yitzhak Katzenelson becomes a vital one:
They, tho children of Israel were the first in deem
and disaster...
Say then, how have these lambs sinned.
Why in days of rioom.are they the first victims
of wickedness... 1^^)
With the disruption ef the natural order the specter of the absurd is
reevoked, and again the tendency is to supply reason where none is
available. Here "reason** takes the form of a myth of retributive
continuity. The cultural residuum - derived from and best expressed as
tho biblical "The sins ef the fathers shall be visited on the children" provides the psychological rationale. Reasonless mutant death is unaccep-
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table,

so t’no chile is seen as punished because of the parent,

serving

as both moans and object of that punishment# To be sure, this is a
universal

phenomenon seen in many instances where the parent watches

his child die. With the memory of dying children confronting him
the concentration camp survivor finds it easier to feel himself at fault
than live with absurdity and a defunct sense of symbolic immortality.
He remembers that
Hundreds of youths fell as burned offerings^*”
The phrasing is important: burned offerings recurs frequently when survi¬
vors are speaking of the dead, and particularly when they are speaking
of children. I believe it to be mere than idiomatic. Burned offerings
were the animals sacrificed at the temple in expiation for one's sina.
It is the language of sacrifice and implies exactly that perception!
the child is sacrificed for the sins of the parents. This mother who
survived her young daughter remembers the daughter's last words
before deportation!
Au revoir, Maman. Courage. I am already sacrificed. See
that you save yourself with the little ones. I give
myself up already as a sacrifice.^5b
That this memory is guilt-laden there can be little doubt. The fellewing
tale reinforces the sense of the child as sacrifice.
My ton year old daughter said to me, "Mother why do you
suffer so on my account? Just leave us here and try to save
yourself"..."Mothermy little girl would say, "pray to
god that we may have an easy death, and let us go by our¬
selves" ...Later on the Ukranian guards reiterated her words
net perish on account of one. My life is

And so we see it again here! death fear subverted to guilt. For
the survivor the question posed by Desteyevski*s Grand Inquisitor has an
answer! A child dies because ef the guilt ef his parents in a scheme ef
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things that if unfathomable is at least erowrly.

The Landscape ef Hell
Tho concentration camp survivors remember many of the atrocities
performed on them by individuals ana various groups. At tho same time
they r-tain a subtle sense of the landscape itself collaborating in their
destruction.

In an almost Kiltonic way the natural environment seems

to be part of the plan for extermination as it takes on aspocts
of the sinister. This symbolizes fer the survivor a feeling ef total
abandonment and victimization. The peint of comparison is tho beneficence
implicit in the tradition that the sun always skines on Jewish holidays.
In mark&d contrast to this it is remarkable hew frequently the malevolent
elements are remembered. Rain,

snow and winter appear to have become tools

of the Nazis!
We wont out to work, it rainea. Winter ana we frezen,hungry.
As we shall see with the imagery of work, the elements alse take en
the import of foreboding;
'Wo sensed when we arose that something is net good
in that day. It was a little chilly. l6l
The cennoctien with death images becemes quite explicit as nearly every
recollection of the death marches recalls an unnospitable envirenment
linked with pictures of dead bodies. This passage by a Pelish orphan
who was in the camps as a thirteen year-old is representative of the
recurrent imagery;
The whole read... it snowed. It was winter when we went
eut. Every ten meters there was a cerpse. *32
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Wnero the imagf' of landscape as collaborator is a more nebulous ono
the image of the camp itself is brought into a very spocific frame of
reference - that of Hell.
This is Hell. Today, in our times, hell must be
like this. 163
Again it is remarkable how often the camp is spoken of in terms of hell,
and more startling is how frequently tho name of Dante is mentioned.
After the camp oxperien~e it is felt
...

one could understand the meaning of Dante.

Yet for the reality ef the concentration camps the imagination of
Dante is merely a starting point. On watching the flames frem the
crematoria one survivor realizes with bitterness
Dante was just a deg. They the SS knew it much
better. 165
As another survivor noted with less acrimony :
In hell one does not see such sights as one has
seon here. 166
The brutality and absurdity of the camps eould only be placed in an
extrahuman setting, for otherwise it defies comprehension. As we noted
earlier the survivor’s sens# of th# experience is that ef utter indescribability. The imagery ef hell provides one more frame of refer¬
ence whereby there can be a comprehensible imagination ef the helecaust
that was the concentration camp.
In a broad sense the imagery of a malevolent landscape is part
ef the imagery ef hell. Dante and the Bible both testify te the
unkindne-ss ef the elements in Hell. Dante’s Hell is a place ef ''endless
night, fierce fires and shromming cold;" Biblical Kell is a dismally
"dark place where there is nothing but grief ... during the obscurity ef
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night and the severity of the cold." But the images of hell and a
malevolent landscape are important to the survivor for reasons other
than the similarity in inclement weather - on# reason is sensory,
the other psychological. The sensory basis for the imagery is the
sheer physical environment ofthe camps: the sight and smell of burning
bodies conjured up one’s nightmares of hell. Flames and vile odors
are part of the archetypal imagery of hell and the concentration camp
survivor had ample opportunity to associate both with hellish
implications:
What...I am unable to forget is the firo by day and night
...and the pits, which wore installed in the year 19^
when again Hungarian transports wore arriving, rendered
a sight which does not yield to description, because one
imagined himself in a living hell. One was encircled all
around by fire. 167
The second reason for the intensity of this imagery, and the prime
psychological underpinning for their vividness and frequency lies
in the way they relate to issues of death and guilt. The relation¬
ship between hell and death is clear: the malficonc© of the elements
and the horrors of hell are part of our shared imagination of death.
Also, for the concentration camp survivor the historical facts
speak for themselves - when the weather get worse mere of their fellows
died.
The imagination of the dark and fiery hell has its roots in the
dynamics of guilt as well. No hero in literature, for example, dies
with the sun shining, for only the malicious of heart are consigned
to th® eternal inclemenc© of hell, or eternal death.

The imagery of hell

is that of lest immortality, lost because those in it have sinned.
The image of hell is net simply tho arch-fire imago or th© metaphor by
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which we describe horrors, it is the mind’s place of punishment, the
place where the guilty go. It is on this level

that the connection

with guilt is realized, and here again *>n a communal level as well
is the process by which the victim feels he has had a hand in his
victimization. This shared residuum of guilt imagery that is part
of our universal mythology provides the context by which the victim
gains mastery over his situation. Suffering for one's sins means
that one is in control of the factors prodeucing punishmont. To be
able to blame oneself for the vagaries of history means that we aro
in a sense in control of that history. Thus the survivor focuses
on the imagery of hell in order to ostablish the context of guilt
and thus, in a monstrous fashion, to establish a context of rationality.
The concentration camp is a distinctive hell in which rosult has no
relationship to motive, and this is the absurdity that the survivor
faces:
The capos or thfe SS men without fault on our part they
called out prisoners and flogged tnem to death.
Tho disruption of cause and effect is beyond belief and difficult to
cope with:
Mevor in life had we dreamed that wo completely
blameless people will be put in a concentration
camp only because we aro Jews. ^9
This landscape of the absurd cannot bo psychologically sustained because
it contains within it the threat of existential annihilation, a
threat that we simply cannot cope with. Mental balance depends on
a perceived rational relationship between action and result; the
third law of thermodynamics is a psychological requirement as well as
a physical one. Tho concentration camp survivor whose held on causal
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relationships must be somewhat more tenuous by the nature of his
experience has need for a cautious sens* of control over his environment*
Human historical experience provides the psychological modus vivenrii.
The survivor feels guilty tnis time by placing the entire event
within the metaphor of hell and placing his role in the event as that
of victim-for-sins. He makes an economical choico in his struggle
for mastery, but one with terrible consequences.

The Clothes of the Dead
This is the first of three images which we may term relational
in that all three-clothing,

food, and work-are markers whereby the

modorn perceives the regularity of his universe. Together they form
a triumvirate of the mundane; where tne previous imagery has beon one
of relatively esoteric abstractions this imagery is distinguished
by its ubiquity, and because of its ubiquity it may be frequently
present to provoke unpleasant memories in the survivor. What we
may consider the banal of the ordinary may be for tho survivor
highly charged symbols of a well-remembered past that are intimately
connected with thoughts of guilt and death.
As relational symbols they also represent, in and of themselves,
aspects of organic continuity; and conversely, as survivors make
evident, their disruption provokes foar of lost connection, when
clothing was immediately taken away on entry inte the camp, a
survivor recalls
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That was a big blow because those wore the
only tokens of remembrance ^0
One's clothing symbolized the style and order of his former life as well
as a link to that life. Just as the natural relationship to one's
former clothing was dislocated so too were the symbols of that formor
life annihilated.
Once in the interstices of the concentration camp clothing
became both a prized and despised commodity. It was prized because
of its practical value for survival in conditions that were always
less than benevolent; despised because it became inseparable from
images of the dead and dying.
When we went to the shower hall we saw the clothing
of the people who wore not anymore, lying there. The
clothing was still there. We recognized the clothing of tho
people who had left and returned no more.1'1
Clothing becomes a metaphor for death
From the laundry, the laundry I come
from washing the garments of death
from washing the shirt of Eli,
Washing out the blood, washing out the sweat
child-sweat, washing eut death.
As every survivor knew
the clothing was that of the killed ^^3
and it became symbolic of those lost lives. And survival inasmuch as
it depended on adequate clething, then became a function of ethers
deaths :
In Auschwitz there was enough to wear. There
was the clothing of the dead. They were burning
people every day.
In a sense that was not entirely unrealistic the survivor felt himself
profitting from those deaths. Compounding this only slightly, at
the other end of the Nazi machine clothing meant an unwilling act
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of charity,

for after the survivors wero given the rags the intact

goods went to the German citizenry at home. This too the survivors knew#
The clothing of the dead also entered into communal imagery in
that it was often symbolic of a disparate but total destruction of
the community:
The clothes and all the belongings were taken away
and wore distributed even to other prisoners... In
Buchenwald we wore later the suits in Auschwitz.
There is a sense of shared fate with those in other concentration
camps. However they know this or imagined it the concentration earap
survivor feels via the clothing a sense of communal loss and at tho
same time a sens® of guilt that he has benefited from oven these
distant deaths.
As a further imprint of this memory the sight of a lost friend’s
or relative's clothing was often the last contact the survivor had
with any remnant of the dead and with the dead themselves. The sheck
of recognition could be frighteningly profound:
... they were gassed 2nd the next day the clothing that
these people were wearing was already back in the laundry.
It was in this manner that I recognised the clothes of
one of my colleagues who came with me from Berlin. His
number was marked on the clothes.
It was said they go... to Lublin. But since within an hour
the same clothes, that means the uniforms with the numbers
...would come back. Wo knew exactly that people were not
transported to Lublin in the nude, and it did net take
long before we got the word... that the people were gaskilled. W
As the imagery of clothing becomes symbolic of the dead it
evokes the problematic relationship to the dead that the survivor must
continually cope with. To use the clothing of tho dead for purposes
of survival means, in effect, using the death ef another to one's
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advantage. Clothing is part and parcel of the mien of the dead
which should be sacred and untouchable. Not only is the survivor
using the dead for his gain but he is violating their sanctity as
well. The difficulties associated with utilizing anything belonging
to the dead is testified to by this survivor who went about in his
underwear for a time after his pants had been torn off:
^Couldn't you get yourself another pair of pants?}
No that was impossible unless I would have taken
them from a dead man.^'°
The choice he made might well be considered pathologic but to take
from the dead was tainted with feelings of guilt. Even though clothing
might mean a better chance at survival it was always at the expense
of others. In this story of forty-four men taken to be executed the
only one rescued recalls the event through the metaphor of clothing:
The truck with forty-four heaps of clothing stood
in front of tho clothing shed. Wiosenthal was told
to get his clothes and shoes ’without disturbing the ether
heaps.1
The image of clothing is linked to his escape in which it became
the equivalent of the lives he could not save, who died in his stead.
The entire step-wise process from questions of priority to
causality is again psychically reenacted so that tho imagery of
clothing of the dead evokes not so much tho memory of death as
the accusations of guilt:
afterwards they had to take the clothes which everybody
recognized from her mother, from her sister, from her
children They cried with bloody tears. They had to take
those clothes and sort them. And everybody was thinking
’Why did I not go together with them? Why did we remain
alive* 180
Again the survivor is given to feel as if he had a choice in the matter.
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Tho clothing of the dead becomes symbolic of his failure to "go
together vdth them" - which means instead of them.

Food
Recollections of starvation and hunger can be heard from every
concentration camp survivor. For most they are part of a factual
recounting of the deprivations suffered, but in others these memories
are of life and death struggles and hence have rather painful
symbolic implications. The memory of food, contains,

as does much

of the survivor’s residual imagery, dual aspects. It is related to
the death of another in that food was the object of many internecine
struggles between the prisoners. Apart from tho struggles producing
guilt, food has its own symbolic meaning in the sphere of organic
connection by its value in aiding survival,eg. bread is tho "staff
of life." On the first level, the struggle for feed was well remembered:
They simply fight each other for food..both of them
would throw themselves on it.
The memory of having taken part in these struggles is a debasing one
for the survivor. He sees it a pure selfishness in which his desire
for survival exceeded his humaneness.
When I was hungry - ana for all my relatively privileged
position, hunger often twisted my vitals - I was like an
animal. I did not think, I did not remember, I forgot my
husband and my child, and I thought only about one thing:
bread.
That he fought for survival with his fellow victim, that he in a

i
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>ensc became ^art of the victimizing r roccss by denying another* s right
survival is a_ major source of .guilt.
That bread particularly was equated with survival is clearly
remembered by many of tho survivors:
We had to sit around in silence because what did we have
to defend ourselves with? Arid what could wo accomplish?
One was fortunate to get his twenty aeca of bread. This
was the only hope for survival.
... tho best monent for me was before I had eaten because
when I had my ration of bread in my pocket, in my knapsack
... that was tho most happy moment for mo, I knew I have
something to oat when I want to oat. But as soon as it was
eaten I had no hope anymore. ^64
It is ©f note, along these lines, that many stories recount how people
in the camps, when given tho opportunity, could consume huge quantities
of food. When these tales are recounted - as in the case of one prisoner
who drank ten liters of soup at a sitting - there is the sense of the
heroic about it. This in part dorives from tho view that in the camps
eating was a way of affirming life, and the gargantuan ability to eat
is heroic in that it embodies a particular aspect of the hereio • the
ability to affirm life on a grand scale.
The image of food could also assume a perverse meaning in which,
if it suddenly did become freely available, it was an ominous sign:
In the ghetto there already appoarea a saying: If you get
butter today there will be an action [a raid by the SS]
tommorrow. 1^5
It also assumed a diabolical significance when it came to the children:
The way in which the chidren were taken was also interesting.
The German SS entered and gave the children chocolate, so
that the children would be willing to go.
Food which was formerly a symbol of life becomes unmistakeably associated
with doath, oither by its presence or its absence in an irresolvable
paradox of feelings. The link between the dead and the struggle for
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survival becomes inextricably confoundf-.d with images of food, as
evidenced by the following passage:
And since I have suffered from hunger... andso this
horrible thing came to happen. We enlisted a group of
forty people and they brought us to the dead to the
crematory and we received an additional dinner,
He bocamo part of the "Canada Commando" which delivered bodies from the
gas chambers to the crematoria. Ho perceives this as using the dead to
get more food and thus guaranteeing his survival; and for this he fools
profoundly guilty.
The image of food then is one more image in which the central theme
is that of one life traded for another.

The survivor by the fact of

his survival becomes a murderer and the whole community which took
part in the struggle far survival is felt, by complieity er direct
action, to be guilty of sacrificing the dead.
To steal this piece of bread is to choose another man's
death to assure your own life, or at least improve yeur
own possibilities... Any one of us could have stolen that
piece of bread, we were all guilty.

Work and Forced Labor
The residual imagery of work or forced labor is also multivalent;
on the one hand images of death and on the other reminders of guilt.
The fear of death connected with this imagery is also at least two-feld
in nature. It is as the two sides of the coin on both of which you lose:
if you did work the sheer physical exertion would kill you, and if you
didn't the gas chambers would do the jeb of extermination. Any way one
turned work meant death.

6?
The guilt images are of a somewhat difforent nature than the others
ve have cited in that, though the distinction between assailant and
victim is compromised here as well, the resultant imagery of contingency
is not felt in the same im mediate way.

The imagery of one-for-on©

sacrifice is muted as the victim perceives himself as victimizer only
through a great deal of psychological distance.

In a word this is an

imagery of vicarious culpability. Nonetheless this imagery still pro¬
vokes many unwantea feelings from the mind of the survivor because in
working for the Germans he sees himself as contributing to the aestruction of his fellow victims.
Primo Levi recounts his first image of the camp in terms of work!
Wo saw a large door, above it a sign brilliantly illuminated
(its memory still strikes me in my dreams) Arbeit Kacht Frei.
Work gives freedom. l'r9
For the most part v;ork was viewed as an attempt te survive. The
freedom in the Auschwitz slogan meant only life for tho moment, as long
as one could work.
Work 1 We too had worrios about work l The day my man was
working we had hopes to survive that cay. But when people
came to the gates of the ghetto and said ’no mere work'
required’ that was a dark day. 190
In tho concentration camps as well
We w*?re only conscious that during all the time we
were in concentration camps we were always afraid to be
unable to work. 191
Slave labor was a forced reason for being, part of the process of
dehumanization in which
They were to earn their existence.19^
This imagory of work-equals-survival shifted with the changing
directives of the "Final Solution." The psychehistorical connection
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becomes evident in this shifts the nature of the historical process
varies and the psychological imagery changes with it. As genocide
became more important than slave labor the nature of that labor became
altered, it
was not workl It was to exterminate people. It was
not v.ork, v.’ork that is of some use. 193
Work was no longer evoking fears of death by being equated with death’s
opposite; it became a death force in itself as it no longer held any
guarantees for survival. The inscription ovor the gate at Auschwitz
had a limerick ending composed by the prisoners to indicate the new
image of work:
Work makes free
In crematory two and three.

19^

The only freedom to be found is in death. The connotation of the word
"work" reflected this new historical emphasis. Sarly in the camp one
would volunteer for work details knowing it had seme survival value.
Later the "request" for laborers took on ominous meanings:
They took us to work. We knew what that meant.195
In Auscwitz there was n* work. 196
Whether the work was of the survival-value type or exterminationwerk it evokes in the survivor images of impending death. Sven the work
which was felt to insure survival was risky for they were constantly
being beaten on the job and death, even at the easiest work, was a
commonplace.
Sven under the assumption that work did hold some tenuous means te
survival there ware considerable conflicts attendant on the actual labor.
The question of contributing to the cause of the oppressor was a partic¬
ularly painful one. For some there was little question
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To work
in a fur factor;/-? But for whom? Ths Germans...
A Jew in general should not move for the Germans even
a finger. Ke had a task to destroy them... That is what
_ i -)
a. i.oOxj
my iiti.er. IQ 71
The father on the other hand can find ways of justifying his actions:
One fur coat,two fur coats... You cannot fight the Gormans
and with it you won't help the Germans. 19&
Others felt similarly that not to work meant suicide ana work had
little effect on anything except perhaps their survival. Work in areas
in which much of the psychological distance between labor and its offocts
are bridged, as in the manufacture of weapons in which the victims
can see themselves impeding the chances of survival for themselves
and their friends?is much more difficult,

for it evokes the sense

of complicity in a direct ana undiluted fashion. Guilt is always tho
major affect of the conscious conflict, and this produces a need to
justify having had some part in the war effort:
We had to do it, there was no way out.1*99
We manufactured cannons whether wo wanted to or nop. 200
A young Polish girl makes tho conflict generating these apologies
explicit:
To workl I should stamp cartridges for the machine guns,
with which Gormans would shoot (and these were the last
munitions factories) the Americans who camo to liberate
us.
She resolved her conflict by producing defective equipment. But for
most others this resolution was eithor impossible or suicidal, and
for them t’n® quostion of a subtle complicity is continually revived
with the imagery of work. And with this intimation of guilt comes
the reminder of how closely it was linked to tho death of self
and others. Though this may bo complicity at a distance, or a vicarious
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culpability,

the guilt images are no less profound than if the

imagery was that of sacrifice. For the survivor there is no respite
even in a guilt that is far removed.

CHAPTER IV

THEORETICAL ISSUES

Guilt was not invented it Auschwitz, it was disfigured there.
- Elie Wiosel

images of the survivor are repetitions of similar themes in
varying abstracted contexts, the common cor© being the memory and
awareness of a violent and relentless mortality. Yet the residual
images are retained in such a fashion as to shift the focus from
death to guilt, and guilt in turn is also often barred free expression
apprehended only by going beyond the more blatant elements of the
survivor syndrome. Explanation for the labyrinthine maneuvers and
defenses whereby this altered perception is achieved has been offered
in a variety of theoretical propositions, but, as John Stuart Mill was
apt to point out, ’’truth” is most often found in the multiplicity of
part-truths that can be garnered from those offered as absolutes. The
case is similar her©: there are a number of astute and important
theoretical formulations for survivor guilt, but, as I see it, a more
accurate raison for the concentration camp survivor’s dilemma is best
discerned by gleaning various aspects of these formulations and
joining them in a cohesive statement.
Perhaps the most dogmatic otiologic formulation of survivor

pnp
guilt has boen that of the "Anlage” school
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which states that
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tne inability to recover from a traumatic experience must be and
is without exception due to pre-morbid emotional disturbances; that
the stress of a disaster alone - including an t-vent with the massive
traumatizing potential of the camps - can produce chronic symptoms
is categorically denied. Cn these grounds during the early days
of restitutions by the German government many victims who claimed
emotional disturbances subsequent to and resulting from the concen¬
tration camp experience vjcrc denied reparations.
Anlage or promerbid psychological defects as the cause of an
inability to recover from psychic trauma has been mentioned as a
possibility in the Extreme Situation by Wolfenstein,203 and Archibald
and Tuadenham noted that those with the combat syndrome had a
higher incidence of childhood loss,^^" but both statements are some¬
what speculative. Other studies on the concentration camp survivor have
suggested precisely the opposite to be true. The conclusions drawn
from several long-term statistical studies of disparate survivor groups
revealed that "nothing from the precaptivity period was of significance
in the development of the concentration camp syno’rome."

^05 one

again suspects that neither absolute is entirely true, and that there
is some connection between premorbid events (though not necessarily
premobid pathology) and the survivor syndrome. One example is the
finding by Or. A. Heir that those traumatic experiences of the camps
most often remembered were those which could be linked to precamp
experiences, either real or fantasized. ^06 There is a melding of
the childhood memory and the camp imago. That this is the case seems
quite reasonable and in accordance with general psychological thinking.
To subscribe to the anlage thoory in its entirety,howevoy is to deny
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the destructive potential of a traumatic event as the concentration
camp. On the other hand to entirely neglect the psychological
equipment individuals bring to the events in their lives is to
deny the varieties of human response. It soems that the most reason¬
able and precise answer lies in a concordance of opposites: individual
psychology and historical experience are both valid aspects of the
survivor's predicament.
A considerably more abstract formulation, but one that I would
suggest is also more accurate is Rosenman's attribution of guilt t©
a regression-induced personification of the disaster in which he assigns
the animistic assimilation of the disaster to the three
separable units of the ego structure: the representation
of the significant other ... the interrelationship between
’ significant other, and the representation of the

The roots of guilt lie in our sense of connection to others and in
the mea culpa of our elemental egocentricity. The significant other
of a disastor is usually conceived of as the divinity, but the origin
of guilt lies in man himself.
The universal feeling is that when we suffer we must be to some
degree at fault, and, hence, guilty. We have seen that this sense
becomes hypertrophied in the mind of the concentration camp survivor
to a self-accusatory "Why did I survivo when I am at fault?." The
self is the center of the question but the context is the relationship
of the self to significant others, in this case the dead.
The representation of tho significant other in terms of tho
deity is operant among concentration camp survivors particularly
in the images of community. The interrelationship between self and
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this significant other also operates in the same area, but it is
Rosenman's third unit, the assimilation of the disaster to represent¬
ation of self, that is a dominant feature of survivor guilt. The
disaster is both consciously and unconsciously made part of one's
self, and as an instrument of the self it not only manifests one's
aggressive urge but also assures self-preservation since one is part
of the disaster force rather than object of its wrath. V.'olfonstein
attributes the sense of guilt to an "I'm glad it wasn't me who died"

203
attitude followed by a fear of the vindictive dead.
Fenichel

Similarly,

p OQ
' 7 in speaking of survivors in general and Bettelhcim on

concentration camp survivors in particular

21C

have also stated that

guilt ever the death of another is guilt over the feeling of joy
that it has not been oneself. Though I see the issue as a good deal
moro complex this reinforces Rosenman's point that tho individual sees
himself in some fashion as an integral part of the cause of other's
destruction and as beneficiaries of that destruction. In psychoanalytic
terms, tho victims are forced to choose their own egos as love-objects
to the exclusion of all elso; and in striving for this psychic
self-preservation they create an insoluable superego conflict
resulting in a chronic survivor guilt.

211

Lifton makes this conflict

explicit6ly clear:
The survivor can never inwardly, simply conclude that it
was logical and right for him, and not others to survive.
Rather he is bound by an unconscious perception of organic
social balance which makes him feel that his survival was
made possiblo by others deaths: If they had not died, he
would havo had te; if he had not survived, someone else
would havo. Such guilt as it relates to survival priority
may well be that most fundamental to human existence. ^12
This viow, to be sure, is much different than the theory that the

\
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survivor experiences "joy" over the death of another in his stead,
and then self-recriminations for this death wish against others 213,
the reasoning which serves as the basis for Bottelheim*s otiologic
formulation:
I believe, on the basis of my experience, that this guilt
is not for the death of the other but for how one felt
about it... But it is the morally unacceptable feeling
of happinoss-that it was not I but another who drew a bad
lot-w'nich makes one feel guilty and not that one owes one's
existence to a follow human beings misfortune.
... short of pathological casos such guilty feelings are
more pretended than real. They are a p>retenso adopted
mainly to avoid having to admit how glad one felt that it
was they and not I who died. Thus, the claimed guilt about
the dead is very much a denial of feelings that are morally
unacceptable. But existential guilt is a luxury one can?1,
afford only if one's life is not in immediate jeopardy.
^
The first issue here is one of definition: What is a pathological
case? There are indications that to varying degrees the incidence of
the survivor syndrome is quite high.

216

Similarly, it appears that

this nigh incidence of undisputed pathology is accompanied by an
equally high incidence of survivor guilt which appears to be existential
in naturo. There is also evidence that in any disaster there is a
perception that the "other" sacrificed himself for the survivor;
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and corollatea with this is the higher inaiaonce of guilt seen when
the victims are children, for the doctrine of the child's innocence
is absolute proof that they suffered for the sins of the survivor.
I would agree with 3«ttelheim on a rather crucial point, that
existential guilt is not a major consideration when one's life is
in danger. The dynamic wo have seen suggests that it is the imagory
of existential connection that is inherent in. the camps, but it is
only later whon hope for the return of the dead has faded and the
concerns of the survivor focus more and mere on painful images of
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death and

y ing that the existential guilt itself comes int* play.

This is v;hy there is a symptom-free interval - a period between
liberation from the camps and t'r.6 onset of symptoms - which marks
the transition from a latent imagery to a manifest guilt.

In other

words Bettelheim is correct to the extent that existential guilt is
possible only when threats to mortality are not present; it involves
a confrontation with immortality that presupposes a safe mortality for the moment at least. Bettelheim may also be correct that in the
camps one's guilt was over feeling happy about another's death and
that some of the residual guilt stems from those feelings, but it
scorns to rnt that the major part of the survivor's guilt is a
"luxurious" one that deals with issues of organic connection, and
that enables

im to recover from tne psychehistorical dislocations of

his experience.
Bethalhfcim's formulation has been phrasec in more doctrinaire
psychoanalytic terms. Szatmari suggosts that the survivor's problem
is his inability to copo with " aregurgitation of the early aggressive
fantasies now projected onto reality," 218 that is, the fantasios
derived from infantile aggressions and death wishes toward parents
and siblings. 219
This relationship between infantilo fantasies and guilt suggests
that thoro may ba a relationship between the age during which intern¬
ment took place and the nature of survivor guilt. The evidence here
varies from the confusing to the contradictory. Theoretically speaking
''the economic considerations themselves are subject to phase specific
genetic development and are different in different age periods of
the life cycle." 220

Yet

Sitinger

and Askevold concluded that age had. no

bearing on survivor guilt or any manifestation of the survivor syr.dromo.

221
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Liiederland, on the other hind, directly relates the severity of both
ruilt and syndrome to the earlier the ago of trauma. ^2

Chodoff

cites age-dcpendcnt differences in that children who survived showed
frequent emotional maldevelopment and character deformation

J

; ho

docs net elaborate on how these differ from the emotional malaise
of adult survivors.

(Anna Freud and Sophie Dann whs worked with

children under three years of age who had survived Terezin found that
they were markedly hypersensitive,

.^y The

to handle
to

restless, aggressive and difficult

age factor seems to be more specifically related

forms of symptomatology among older ago groups. In tho twenty to

thirty year old group chronic anxiety dominated tho syndrome and in tho
thiry to forty group depression was the major factor.
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There does

not appear to be any change on the form or type of guilt evidenced.
This agrees with recent work in which it was found that thirty to
forty year old depressives were generally characterized by chronic
anxiety during their twenties. What we are seeing among survivors, then,
appears ts bo no different in this respect, from the "control"
population of depressed patients. We are left with the impression
that age does relate to more general manifestations of the syndrome
but that it has no effoct on the form of guilt (excopt perhaps the
very young in whom death guilt is incomprohendablo) although Lifton
does point out that adolescence is a time of heightened sensitivity
to death guilt, and exposure to massivo trauma at this time may
produce a more intense and long-lasting conflict with death imagery
and hence a moro profound survivor guilt.
Another external factor in the genesis of guilt may be that of
difforing cultural patterns of response. Here again there is no clear-
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cut evidence either way, but tlicro ire some significant indicators
that these factors may be important. Wolfenstein has noted several
differences in response to the extreme situation among varying

.

cultural groups,
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,

snowed

very marked cultural differences in response to sickness and pain.
Eitingcr*s study of Norwegian and Israeli concentration camp survivors
showed markedly less guilt in the former group,
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attributing it

to the historical differences in the experiences of the two groups;
in marked contrast to the Israeli group many of the Norwegians had
initially been sent to the camps after arrest for acts of bravery and
resistance, and when they returned homo they were greeted as heroes.
I would agree with this analysis and ascribe these differences to
historical circumstance rathor than cultural variable. In another
study Gronnor suggested that
the end of a made of life as it has been known affects
the German-Jewish victim much more than the Polish or
Russian Jew who has always known a life of isolation
and persecution. ^
Despite my own belief in significant cultural variables affecting
survivor responses, this statement strikes mo as patently absurd.
There are we know significant differences in the life styles of
the Eastern and Western European Jewish communities, but to say
that one group was affected more than another betrays a considerable
intellectual myopia. Gronner seems to forget that this uprooting
was not simply to a more oppressive ghetto, but to an extreme
environment for which no former life pattern could have adequately
prepared one. And among those who survived to leave the camps for
elsewhere the annihilation of the Eastern European shtetl culture was
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surely as dislocating as the geographical shift fron on© cosmopolitan
center to another was for many a Western Jew. The difficulties for both
groups were enormous and I, for one, would hesitate evaluating their
relative severity. The issue as I see it is not who suffered more, but
whether thero are different responses to the trauma among thoso groups
whose suffering can barely bo fathomed, no less comparod.
Trautman,^31 Chodoff,232

Klein, et al.^3 have all indicated that

they found no significant cultural differences in the nature of tho
syndromo. To my mind however tho creative response to the experience
shows the opposite to be true. The bulk of tho work by Eastern European
Jewish survivors has been of a fictional or memoir nature with tho
effort being a transoendont one: in tho case of the fictions to place
the experience within a universal spiritual framework; the memoirs aro
efforts at completing a mission - of bringing tho truth to the world.
In both categories the attitude toward the dead is that of unquestioning
reveronce. Among Wostorn Europeans

tho work has been a good deal more

analytical: psychological and historical evaluations in which, though
they also attempt to place the event in a universal frame, tho attitude
is one of profound skepticism; and the dead aro as much subject to the
questions (and accusations) of this analytical skepticism as aro tho
living. Admittedly I have picked a small distorted sample of survivors
who aro meeting their problems in tho idiom of creativity, but none¬
theless the differences are so marked that I think they bear mention.
A last point also worth mention: in Wolfenstein's study of Extreme
Situation survivors ^

and Muller’s work on concentration camp survivors^-*

both noted a more pronounced element of guilt among Jewish groups.
Cultural and chronological variables aside, we have noted previously
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tho suggestion by Aosenman that survivor guilt may have adaptive
potential by providing the illusion of control. An alternative benefit
can be gathored from Freud regarding tho possibility of guilt associated
with mourning giving rise to
The self-torments of melancholiacs, which are without doubt
pleasurable, signifying a gratification of sadistic
tendencies and of hate, both of which relate to an object
and in this way havo both been turned around upon tho
seif... the sufferers usually succeed in the end in taking
revenge, by tho circuitous path of self-punishmont, on the
original objects and in tormenting them by means of the
illness, having developed tho latter so as to avoid the
necessity of openly expressing their hostility against
their lovod ones. ^3°
This dynamic may be extended into the realm of survivors highlighting
the relationship between ontologic and neurotic guilt.

Just as there

are aspects of melancholia that serve as adaptational subterfuges
designed to avoid confrontation with a more provocative reality,
so survivor guilt may also be a means of avoiding a more painful
ontologic guilt. There may be an unconscious, purposively induced,
neurotic guilt which is symptomatic of a deoper malaise, rather
than being in and of itself tho main problem.
Among Hiroshima survivors Lifton observes that
this identification with death, the whole constellation
of inv;ardly exporienccd death symbolism is, paradoxically
enough, the survivor's means of maintaining life, because
in the face of the burden of guilt that he carries,
particularly guilt over survival priority, his obeisance
before the dead is his best moans of justifying and
maintaining his own existence.^37
Gumbel also notes adaptational aspects of survivor .guilt which serve
similar purposes by different focus:
it seems to me that the unrealistic guilt feelings, common
to aLmost all survivors, are not only of a regressive
pathologic nature. Tnere may be something positive about them.
As against a devastating realization of a complete lack of
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justice and of a moral order in tho world and the feeling
of utter helplessness, guilt feelings can be an affirmation
of meaning and a person’s ability to exert influence upon
his own life and the course of events in general, ho who
believes in his own guilt and responsibility establishes
or reinstates his active involvement and part in life and
endows it with a purpose, thus repudiating his spiritual
annihilation. 233
Gardner, extending Rosenman's concept to all forms of nourotic guilt,
suggests that by giving one a sense of control guilt serves to allay
existential anxiety

^39

and thus is always adaptive. Chodoff sees

other benefits derived from maintaining a constant state of guilts
survivors cannot give up their guilt
because unconsciously this would amount to forgetting their
parents and siblings and thus betraying their memories. It
may also be that ... unconsciously related to a need to suffer
in order to continue to bear witness to the cruelty to
which they had been treated, since to get well would amount
to forgiving the German persecutors and this to striking
another bitter blow of betrayal at murdered friends and
relatives. 240
This last theme, of bearing witness, may be a oarry-over from the camps
where tho sense of having a mission was often a life-saving defense
similar themes served this purpose among hibakus'na as well.

c It is a

source of strongth and hope by which tho survivor can carry on.

It is a

link to the past as the mission is most often te recount what happened,
and at the same time it is a link to tho future since the recounting is
felt to be efficacious in preventing the same thing from over happening
again.
Though his maneuvers may be adaptive the unresolved issue is why
the survivor finds himself unablo to simply discard his residual imagery.
Why, instead, does it remain so potent a force in his mind, and why can
he not cope with it in a way that would successfully ameliorate its
malignant effects? In short, why must the survivor ongage in adaptive
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manouvers around the imagery rather than achieve mastery within the
framework of his experience?
Lifton's concept of "death guilt" in Hiroshima survivors is crucial
to a projected answor;

he speaks of it as

all forms of self condemnation associated with literal
or symbolic exposure to death and dying^ including those
usually linked with a sense of shame.
The means by which this guilt is remembered is "the ultimate horror:"
a specific image of the ceaa or dying with which the
survivor strongly identifies himself ana which evokes
in him particularly intense feelings of pity and selfcondemnation. 244
The ultimate horror thus form the hibakusha1s residual
ima‘-o - tha pic totalization of. his central conflict in
relationship to the disaster.
^
We have seen this to bo the caso among concentration camp survivors as
well, and in both groups particularly potent aspects of these images
are those of women and children who could not be saved.Thero are two
factors eporant here. The survivor has boon confronted with a joltingly
irrevocable awareness of death,
not only has any preexisting illusion of invulnerability
been shattered but he has disturbingly confronted his own
mortality, with his own death anxioty. ^46
Further,
since survival by definition involves a sequence in which
one person dies sooner than another, this struggle in turn
concerns issues of comparative death-timing. Relevant here
is what we have spoken of as guilt over survival priority
along with tho survivor's sonso of an organic social balance
which makes him feel that his survival was purchased at the
cost of another. 247
These factors are intimately related to one another: death fear is partly
a consequence of the guilt that accompanies mourning over the death of
another, and this guilt has an ontelogic base in that its imagery is that
of organic continuity. Thus images ef women and children predominate for

they represent,above and beyond the issues of social balance, modos
of im.nortality. Tneir deaths present the survivor with the ultimate
threat to his sense of symbolic immortality by embodying symbols of
severed connection with the historical continuum, mutant death, and
disruption of organic continuity. This ultimate threat in turn evokes
the ultimate guilt: that the survivor in some way bears responsibility
for his loss. In a horrible way this has some basis in a reality which
the survivor can distort for purposes of self-condemnation because it
was true that that many survivors could not save the dying or even caso
their passing. It is chis sense of helplessness that inspires the selfreproach which gives rise to death anxiety and guilt.
The imagery fomenting death guilt is imprinted onto the psyche
of the survivor. 243

Subject te the continual threat ef symbolic

reactivation - an event, werd,

or sight that reevekes the imprintod

residual image - the survivor engages in what Liften terms "psychic
numbing." Having its roots in the defense mechanism ef denial psychic
numbing enables the survivor te utilizo a "reversible ferm of symbelio
death in order te avoid a pormanent physical or psychic death." 249
There may be efforts to break out of this numbing:
the urgency with which many Hiroshima and concentration
camp survivors married (or remarried) and had children
dead but te reassert vitality

This "psychic opening-up" is all too frequently incomplete, and therein
lies Lifton's dynamic for the survivor syndromo. He sees psychic openingup as necessary te carry out the work of mourning; and tho work of mourning
is the essential repair that must be implemented by the survivor in order
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to formulate his relationship to the dead. This relationship to tho
dead in turn defines his sense of immortality and connection. Psychic
numbing which begins as a defense may end as a pathogenetic factor.
Extremely important is Lifton's suggestion that the neurotic
process may be a manifestation of psychic numbing. The concentration
camp survivor’s experience suggests that this equation requires
certain modifications. Neurotic guilt is akin to psychic numbing in
that both arc adaptational. For tho hibakusha , however, numbing is
utilized as a protection against images of death and personal culpabil¬
ity. For the concentration camp survivor self-condemnation is not denied.
On xhe contrary, it is this sons© itself that is utilized as tho content
of neurotic guilt which then servos to divort tho survivor's focus from
the more painful images of death and its concommitant ontological guilt.
In other words, where psychic numbing anesthetizes feelings about the
central Images of death neurotic guilt inundates tho survivor with
peripheral images of guilt. In a sense this seems to servo as a kind of
long-term psychic numbing (which itself, it sooms, cannot bo maintained
over extended periods). Part of this difference in diversionary tactics
lies in the differing nature of tho two experiences. Tho concentration
camp survivor is simply unable to deny the imagery of guilt for it is
his only means of submerging tho moro provocative and painful ©ntic
issues.
Just as psychic numbing, neurotic guilt also impairs mourning, but
where numbing doss not allow a resolution of death guilt by barring its
expression neurotic guilt impairs mourning by effecting a_ permanent con¬
frontation with this guilt which serves equally well to obstruct tho

woflk of mourning.
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This distinction is implicit in Lifton's observation that
concentration camp survivors, their trauma being more extensive in dur¬
ation at least, are more "likely to retain more diffuse and severe psy¬
chic impairment while in hibakusha doath imagery tends to be more pre¬
dominant." ^51 The key to this difference lies not only in the time
differential but primarily with tho symbolic elements that became the
central imagery of the camps. The residual imagery of tho Hiroshima
survivor revolves around the dead and dying. The emphasis of the
concentration camp survivor is on imagery of fault - that is, one's
role in the death of others and, hence,

one's moral (or ontological)

connection to these dead. Whore the Hiroshima survivor sees tho dead in
a direct light tho concentration camp survivor viows them through tho
penumbra of his own complicity. Thus the degree of death guilt is not
only related to the sheer quantity of death imagery but to the kind of
symbolic perceptions which accompany it. I would agree with Lifton that
the massive encounter with death and its threats to the sense of sym¬
bolic immortality is tho basic progenitor of survivor guilt. I would
differ in regard to the concentration camp survivor for whom tho encoun- .
ter with doath is intrinsically admixed with images of contingency thus
mitigating the effects ef psychic numbing.I would maintain that tho
historical circumstancos ef the camps and the cultural desiderata which
the survivors brought to them place the survivor in a position whore
rathor than avoiding guilt he immerses himself in it as protection
from a more painful immersion in doath.
This distinction is indicative ©f the fact that psychic numbing
servos as a protection against threats from without - Hiroshima was
essentially an external experience as regards the clear distinction

)
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betwocn assailant and victim. Where psychic numbing proves to be
inadequate is in coping with threats from within. Although the his¬
torical actuality of tho concentration camps was one from without
the distinction between victim and victimizer became blurred and the
psychological reality was transformed into an internal threat. The victims
imagine themselves accomplices in thoir own victimization. This forced
impulse to self-condomnation brings the survivor into proximity of
his ontologic fears as the issues in his mind aro doath and an existential
crisis aoout themes of complicity in causing doath. The essence of this
conflict, as our examination of the residual imagery has shown is the
continuing struggle of the survivor to deal with his role in the
event.
Trautman has made ©bsorvations on concentration camp survivors
which, to some extent, parallel Lifton'sl
The background of the anxiety in survivors is tho implanted
fear of being killed. It is an existential fear connected
with tho dynamic of a traumatized self-preservation instinct..
.* It is associated with conscious and unforgettable memories
that are not repress®! though sometimes pushed out of focus. ^52
They also showed a universal felr of death for their relatives
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which gainsays Bettleheim's contention that the survivor's motivations
were entirely selfish, do ’Wind takos this a step further: he feels that
it is the fear of death which is the pathogenetically important
factor in the survivor syndrome.
... on returning to normal society, the ex-prisoner was
unable to rid himself of the fear caused by the image of
his own death. Too ofton he was - or is - inclined
automatically to associate "future’1 with doath... The
avoidance of the image of his own death gives rise to a
persistent syndrome in the ex-prisoner. ^5^
I think that this statement by do Wind taken together with Lederer's
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Ledorer's suggestion that the fear of death which originally was only
anxiety-provoking becomes a fear of life - a lack of trust in the world
and the possibility of goodness ^55. defines the elemental genetio
principle of the syndrome.
To explain survivor guilt dynamically, however, I would agree
with Lifton and argue that the concept of impaired mourning must bo taken
as tho crucial link between the fear «f death and survivor guilt. Mourning,
as tho adult conceptualizes death as an absolute, is worked through via
a oomploxly organized ritual. This
ritual is a symbolic transformation of experiences that
no other medium can adequately express. Because it springs
from primary human need, it is spontaneous activity - that
is to say it arises without intention, without adaptation
to a conscious; its growth is undosig ned. its pattern purely
natural, however intricate it may bo. 256
Though primarily intrapsychic ritual becomes centrifugal: it radiatos
outward from the needs of tho individual to acquire a social usefulness.
Tho role of mournor reestablishes a sens® ef place in, and belonging to,
a comnrunity-at-large which sympathizes with his grief. There is reaffir¬
mation of a supportive social order with assurances of continued kinship
from members of this social order.

Perhaps most important, mourning rites

allow for a completo immersion in grief, and, at tho same timo, a gradual
amelioration and systematic curtailment of this grief.

2S7 Tho social

consequences of ritual in turn reflect back centripetally to moot tho
needs of the individual by allowing him to adopt a particular socially
condoned style of mourning. Gorer has delineated eight general stylos,
only two of which need concern us here. 258 ’’Time-limited mourning',' a
specifio temporally-predetermined sequence of grieving ceremonies, is
felt te be the most efficacious ef all the mourning styles in aiding
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readjustment.

^-59

Conversely, "unlimited mourning" with a prolonged

period of despair is seen to bo least effective; it is this stylo that
prevails among groups with no defined ritual. W# can safely extrapolate
and say that among those who ordinarily do have a ritual but arc unable
to carry it out, no matter what tho reason, the tendency toward despair
will become very pronounced. This is an important consideration, parti¬
cularly for Jewish concentration camp survivors who prior to internment
adhered to a highly formalized time-limited mourning sequence.
Even among these who have few religious ties, be it survivors
or the general population, the social tecniques for confronting
death are primarily religious. As Gorer, succinctly puts
is a religious preserve."
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it? Death

For tho survivor this too presents a

serious dilemma. The adherence to ritual was impossible and carrying
out time-limited mourning in any way remotely resembling the proscribed
manner was absurd even to think about. Even after the concentration
camp experience was over achievement of ritual demands could not be
met because the proper timo - as - well as the emetional substrate
upon which this timing was based-had long since passed.
The fact of cromation in the camps also contributes to tho
survivor’s difficulty. Cromation is "felt to get rid of the dead more
completely and finally than does burial,"

and, further complicating

matters, it is taboo in Jewish ritual. Lifton’s concept of the
"missing dead"

oxplains the difficulty?

the survivors sense that the bodios-the human remains
- around which he might ordinarily organize rituals of
mourning abruptly disappeared into smoke or nothingness.
In those ways mourning is rendered shallow and unsatisfying.
Distorted visions of death and the inability to conform to ritual in tho
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expected manner confound the survivor’s efforts to mourn. Thcro is
every reason to believe that in addition to his other problems the sur¬
vivor must also contend with impaired mourning.
It is along the same lines that Kiedorland

and Heorloo 264

have noted an unusually frequent emergence of survivor guilt in the clin¬
ical sotting as unresolved mourning. Mocrloo's patients complained of
their inability to mourn in the camps, feeling that the necessary
rituals would have been a threat to their survival. Again,
offiir

I would

that these rituals could not be carried out on a psychological

levol either; in the camps mourning was an impossibility for part of the
work of mourning is to allay the death fear that is ubiquitous in the
camp itself. Simply, the sense of immortality essential for completion
of mourning could not be attained in the concentration camp for
the sense of continuity is a function of man’s historical perspective.
Wo see ourselves as ereatures of history firmly rootod in a psychohistorical process and bound to a vast concatenation of collective
experiences. When this bend is severed, when we see ourselvos outside
of the natural progression of historical events, beyond the connection
between past and future, the feeling that we are part of an erganic
continuum is lost. The death of another temporarily gives us this
experience. The death of another that seems wut of place in the flew
of history further severs our sense of connection. The radical dis¬
placement of the concentration eamp surviver shatters all cennection.
As one survivor put it:
For living men, tho units of time always have a value which
increases in ratio to the strength of the internal resources
of the person living through them; but for us hours, days,
months spilled out sluggishly from the future into the past
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always too slowly, a valueless and superfluous material,
of which we sought to rid ourselves as soon as possible,
iv’ith the end of the season when the days chased each other,
vivacious, precious, and irrecoverable, the future stood in
front of us, grey and inarticulate, like an invincible barrier.
For us history had stopped. ^c>5
The concentration camp survivor has stopped out of the shared historical
experience.

Outside what has beon perceived as a continuum, insido this

historical vacuum the survivor loses his sense of existential continuity,
and the fear of dying pervades his psychic life.
If, in spite of all he must contend with, the survivor can somehow
perceive death as appropriate his fears can still be allayed by a sense
that all is proceeding according te plan and that we arc still in control
of our destinies. Mourning is part of the plan and we require no new
protective symbologies to help it proceed unimpeded. let in the case of
the concentration camp survivor evon the sense of appropriateness could
not be had. The tenor of the survivor’s response is, instead, suffused both consciously and unconsciously - with themes of incomplete lives and
mutant deaths. He is terrified by the specter of absurdity and forced
into what Kierkegaard has called a "belief by virtue of the absurd."
For most of us, but even more so for the survivor, this belief is
untenable for it requires a confrontation with primordial images of
death and nothingness, images we cannot confront and remain psychically
whole. The only recourse is in the elaboration of an ameliorating
counter-imagery. In ossence he cannot muster the prerequisite sonse
of transcendental persistence that is part of the work of mourning.
Hillel Klein, however,sees the guilt itself as accomplishing, in
a truncated way, the work of mourning, serving as a means of "identifi¬
cation with the destroyed world,-thereby achieving a restitution by
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identification with lost love objects.” 266 It seems to me that this can
hardly be tho case. Though guilt does establish a sense of connection
it is a highly distorted one essentially characterized by a high
degree of ambivalence toward the dead and the entire mourning process.
The survivor attempts to mourn via various formal rituals and to estab¬
lish a sense of continuity with the lives of tho dead, but at tho same
time ho tries to rid himself of images of the dead which, though crucial
for completion of mourning, he perceives as tainted and threatening. 267
This further heightens his sense of guilt, and rather than being a form
of mourning this guilt becomes part of a vicious cycle which impairs
mourning further.
This cyclo may bo tho perpotual generator for tho chronic survivor
syndromo with guilt being tho ever-presont fuol. do Wind has noted that
therapy often consists of breaking this cyclo, that is aiding tho survivor in carrying out tho work of mourning.

Similarly, tho profound

and protracted mourning carried out by a survivor for recent deaths
(oven years after liberation) often reflects tho roomorgonco of a
heretofore impaired ability to mourn.

I believe that tho theoretical issues now begin to take form. Tho
residual

images imprinted onto tho psyche of tho survivor attains its

potency by boing closely linked to fears of death, issues of symbolic
immortality, and tho sphere of existential guilt. That these themes all
affect the survivor*s efferts to mourn for and define himsolf in relation¬
ship to tho doad is clear. It is a leng circuitous road closely bordered
by elemental themes ef life and death, guilt and innocence, but I believe
we can new begin te delineate that end which has became the life ef the
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survivor.

CHAPTER V

TOWARD A THEORY OF SURVIVOR GUILT

A lie is often an expression of the fear that
ono may b® crus'nod by the truth.
- Franz Kafka
N© peetry after Auschwitz.
- T.W. Adorno

Thero seem to be two forms of guilt active in the psyche of the
survivor - neurotic and ontologic. Neurotic guilt devolves from the
infantile conflicts which set the pattern for all later guilt feelings.
Ontologic or existential guilt derives from the vagaries of an uncertain
existence, coming to the fore with the development of a symbolizing
apparatus that is capable of

integrating the reality of death and a

sense of symbolic immortality to defend against that reality. Both must
develop simultaneously in order to spare the

psycho a painful and

terrifying confrontation with the image of one’s own death. Ontologic
guilt is the cost of human awareness. It is intimately bound up with
symbols of continuity and connection, becoming manifest only when
these symbols are threatened with annihilation. To avoid such threats
the psycho will go to great lengths, it may produce a neurosis or, if
need be, a psychosis t# divert the mind from focusing on images of death.
The concentration camp survivor is faced with just such threats to
his symbolic armor: death and destruction are the residual images of his
most profound experience. He must confront a total abandonment by the
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processes of existence. The concentration aamp was a psyc'nohistorical
vacuum in which the normal flow of time and ovents became disrupted.
Causality aid not exist. "Only tho hero and now exists* yesterday and
tomrnorrow ar® both equal and without reality"

^70, ±s

the complaint of

the survivor in the camps. The anonymity ef time, as Bettelheim terms
it 271, destroyed tho reference from which identity took its origins.
Edith Jacobson speaks of disturbances of time sense among survivors of
Extreme Situations.^72

This suggests that tho role of time itself may

play a more important part than we have recognized.

I spoak of time not

only in the chronological sense, but of the eues and symbols w# derive
from the sheer flow ef timo in tho individual life. The sense of time,
linked to and perhaps derived from tho sense of change. is essential
to provide us with a sense of historical movement and of tho individual's
place within it. It is this sense of individual historicity garnered from
the flow ef timo that enables us to live extrahisterically, that is, to
envision ourselves surviving eur historical time by a symbolic immortal¬
ity. Tho loss of time's cues, of a sense of flux, is another burden of
the survivor for it strands him again in a landscape of the absurd
accompanied enly by an imagery ef death.
Another component ef self-definition is the cycle ef generations,
the natural flew of life and death which provides us with a senso of
place within historical change. This sense ef place gives us, beyond
immortality but part of it as woll, a feeling for the immutability of
our individual lives within a cosmic framework. But immutability requiros
more than being; it requires being within an immutable natural order.
When this order is obliterated by what we have called inappropriate or
( as it might be mere accurately termed when referring to tho profound
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dislocations of the concen'-ration camp) mutant death, the sense of place,
of causal connection with history and the universe is radically altered.
Again it is the absurd which the survivor faces, and this further
engenders ids fears of loss and dying.
This fear in turn is phrased in ontologic terms bocause they best
express our inability t* establish, evon by our own standards of reality,
not a sense of immortality but immortality itself, to overcome not simply
fears of death but death itsolf. We have come to phrase our existential
debilities in terms of personal culpability because in that dimly
remembered ancient time of eur past when we first encountered a dis¬
obedient external world the only causal agent, and hence the only thing
that could be at fault, was ourselves.
This is the elemental guilt we are virtually bern with. When we are
able te cenceptualize doath then death becomes the archctypo for eur
inability to come te terms with existence and it becomes the focus for
eur basic guilt. Ordinarily we do not confront it for we arc shielded
by those symbols which make up our individual and societal mythologies.
When these mythologies, ordinarily firmly-rooted in the oraerod landscape
ef our lives, are shattered by annihilation of that natural landscape
we must either face eur fear and guilt er find other defenses.
The cencentration oamps wore Just such a time. In an envirenmont
in which acausality was the rule, mutant death the commenplace, and the
anonymity of timo the convention, the survivor could in nowiso roly on
those indicos that ordinarily mark tho pattorn of his oxistonco and aid
him in orocting tho symbolic framo by which ho might otherwiso protoct
himsolf.
Tho eoneontration camp prisoner found himsolf in a situation where

I
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a protective symbology was a crucial need but whcro ho could not maintain
one because all illusions had been shattered by stark realities. The
images of absurdity, the ineluctable realities that are the end of every
life, were multiplied many-fold for the survivor within a context of
unspeakable violence. Rather than availing himself of a sense of sym¬
bolic immortality

he finds himself in a continuous stato of threatened

mortality; and whore hope for fulfilled life is tho prerequisite for any
symbols of immortality

coping with prospects of promatur# cessation of

life impairs any further formulations.
Tho psycho simply cannot cope with this poltergeist of annihilation.
Wo know this to b© so from tho normal processes of mourning in which wo
all confront death but through a series of formal rituals not only cop©
with it but swiftly place it in

a perspective that makes it meaningful.

Within tho concentration camp those rituals, and thus the anodyne conc¬
eption of death, could net be acieved,

so the concentration camp survivor

must wait for a safer time to mourn tho dead. While waiting for the
opportunity to mourn, however, the survivor must seek seme temporary
defenses that will enervate the increasingly active and potent death
imagery. Within the camps it appears that psychio numbing and regression
are the most common escapes being maintained until some timo after
liberation. But these mechanisms cannot be used indefinitely because
of tho powerful death imagery imprinted on the mind of the survivor.
Thou h tho basic imagery is always present it forces itself into focus
mere significantly when hope for return of the dead cannot be realisti¬
cally held to and the survivor is forced te confrent the facts en very
real and unequal terms. As he reckons with the deaths of family and
friends and with harsh reminders of his pewerlessness he must also face
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th# knowledge that he teo is subject to the cosmic absurdity of events.
However one cannot remain psycnioally whole and continue facing
the terror of death for any length of time. It has been suggested that
schizphrenia may represent one adaptation in cases whore the symbolizing
apparatus is inadequate to ward off the imagery of death. The ego is loft
with another,

less drastic, choice: it may find a way of diverting its

focus from these images which are too painful to be sustainrd.

It can

choose rather than a psychotic disengagement from reality a neurotic
interlude. Psychosis does not seem to be the diversion of choice; it
appears that there is actually a lower incidence of psychosis among
concentration camp survivors as compared with ether hospitalized patient
populations. Neurosis as we knew, manifest by the elements ef the sur¬
vivor syndrome, is a very frequent finding among survivors; and survivor
guilt is the dominant theme of the syndrome.
It appears that the survivor’s reaction to fear ef the absurd is
the universal one. We all try to allay our fears by an immersion in a
primitive ontological guilt which tells us that we are at fault for all
that occurs. This represents man's earliest attempts to order his universe,
oven if in a recognizably specious manner, by giving himself a sons© ef
eentrel ever events. It also serves to remeve the sense ef absurdity by
implying a merally erdared universe. This vision has at its center the
meaningfulness of death, and as such it makes death, however it may
occur, the natural order ef things. For the survivor things are mere
difficult: having seen the rhythms of life and death interrupted and
profoundly altered ho is unable to sustain any image of death, be it
meaningful or otherwise, and since ontic guilt requires some death
imagery the survivor cannot think entically at all.
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The first attempt at protection and formulation is a failure, and
because the perception ©f an ©ntologically circumscribed universe cannot
be realized th® sens© of symbolic immortality cannot be attained.
Without the sense of symbolic immortality any attempt at mourning
that the survivor initiates would fail for as we have said the work of
mourning requires that this sense be intact. So the death imprint of
the survivor , and the continual symbolic reactivations of that imprint,
impairs not only his efforts at denying absurdity but his efforts to
integrate them by the means ordinarily available. With this tack
unsuccessful the survivor searches elsewhere for relief.* As the herited
medes by which he weuld pretect himself prove ef little value he has ne
choice but to look to the event itself for a way out.
The event does provide a way, one which can utilize the alreadyformed pattern ef entelegic guilt, as well as a way in which certain
historical forms may be recapitulated - which allows the survivor net
only to reinsert himself into a moral universe but to recapture the
immortality in being an integral part ef a recurrent historical pattern.
But te look at the event means to look at death, and this is still
impossible. The event, hewevor, is disjointed, and varying aspects of
it may bo viewed independently - very unlike the tetalism required by
the entic vision - thus providing the survivor with a means ef circumvent¬
ing the death imagery. The actions ef the survivor are liko thoso of a

* Any sense of temporal demarcation that may be inferred is a
linguistic misrepresentation on my part for it appears that all ef
these psychological perambulations take place virtually simultaneously
and disarganizedly deep in the survivor's unconscious.

101
microscopist• ho is able t® focus down with a liigh-powered lens of tho
imagination on a small circumscribed portion which he makes tho central
pGrcopt of the experience. Tho survivor's doubts about his rolo in the
Holocaust is an aspect that has always boon present, but now it is
magnified and made of greater significance than tho more frightening and
central death imagery. The sot of psychological maneuvers whereby the
perception of guilt becomes preeminent is abetted by a blurred distinc¬
tion

between assailant and victim which foments a sense of complicity.
The sens® of guilt derives frem a subtle step-by-step process with

multiple variations that leads from absurdity to complicity, from a
conception of fact to fault, to an equation of thought and act. On three
levels, individual, communal, and relational,the imagery ef contingency
gives tho survivor a sense of being an accomplice in his victimization
rather than simply an unwitting victim. He feels he has had an active
part in his own demise, and that his worst thoughts became realities
merely because he harbored them as thoughts. This transmogrification
of psychohistorieal reality begins with tho death imprint, or tho ultimato
horror. Simultaneously tho ©ntic pattern sets in, but if it is not to
fail as a defense it must be reinforced. The first reinforcement is on
an individual level. In defining his relationship to tho dead the sur¬
vivor cannot view thorn critically because to do so would bo to asperse
the validity and completeness of their lives. For one such as tho sur¬
vivor whose held on his own possibilities is so extremely tenuous any
kind of criticism of the dead can only remind him of tho disintegration
of his own life-value. Se tho dead are idealized in a move that makes
death a mode of immortality by its becoming synonymous with fulfillment
and, hence, an integral part ef the cycle ef generations. Complete lives.
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in the next step ef this psychic syllogism, are the supremely good ones,
and those who diod must have be^n good. The nature of the camps supports
this by negative evidence: there were activities that survivors engaged
in that wore less than ethical, thus, a. fortiori,

the dead whe did net

benefit from this kind of activity were surely saintly. Survival is
equated with wrongdoing, and the survivor becomes a guilty party.
The anemaleusness ef survival helps to reinforce the survivor’s
sense ef inferierity. Witnessing the deaths ef se many people he
knew te bo good he must concludo that in not receiving their lot
he was net. The quintessence ef this imagery is the death ef children
who, since they are presumed innocent and present the most profound
problems of survival priority, could not havo suffered on account
ef any actions of their own. By recourse to an archotypal logacy
he can view the children as innocent sacrifices in his stead, and
by enly a small selipsistie oxtensien

he can view all the dead in this

fashion. In many eases the residual imagery ef the event, as I believe
has been amply shewn, lends itself te this perception, further entrap¬
ping the surviver in his feelings ef meral inferiority and guilt.
A similar dynamic operates on the cemmunal level, where the surviver
has at hand a historical cernmnity of victims with which he identifies.
By doing this he rejoins a historical

movement and can attempt te

share in the extrahisterieal immertality

ef the cemmunity. Inherent in

this cemmunal legacy, however, are also another series ef guilt images
that again

place the surviver in a pesition ef responsibility for

his friends and his nation as a whole. This sense of communal
intordepondenee in matters of culpability may bo s een as a prime
example of how we defend against suffering’s irrationality by means
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•f survivor guilt.
The relational imagery of the camps, that is the everyday aspects
of life, contained similar dual imagery ef death and guilt. It is
connected with aspects of immortality as well as with memories ef
death and dying, but the whole image is distorted as it is viewed
theugh a condenser of guilt.
These images and their variations all serve to disengage, and
eventually disallow the survivor’s focus on the imagory ef death that
initially threatened to overwhelm him. The price ho pays is that ef
an immersien in guilt; by moans of continual solfdoproeation and
the impossibility of atonement by virtue ef the fact that the objects
of his guilt are no longer here (er were never here as he perceives
them) the cycle of chronic guilt is established.
The only possibility for atonement lies in working through
mourning with resolution of ambivalent feelings about the dead and
integration of their memories in a cohesive self-system. The problem,
though, is that the survivors inability to copo with any images ef
tho dead continues to impair mourning. In effeot the focus on guilt
which diverts tho concentration camp survivor from tho imagery of
death that threatens him also prevents him from dealing with images
of death that might aid him in reselving tho difficulties of mourning.
Thus, via the labyrinthine cennoctions between the guilt of mourning
and the guilt of survival (both of which we may censider medem
!,refinementsrt of the primitive entic guilt),the result is a paradox¬
ical one: by an exclusive focus on the latter form of guilt the
survivor cannot deal with tho former. In other words, by being
exclusively concerned with the imagination of complicity in which
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guilt is the focus, a distortion of reality ensues impairing efforts
to deal with relationships to the dead, especially those that are
guilt-laden.
Tnis is where the survivor stands 5 he cannot mourn because
he cannot confront the dead. He cannot confront the dead for
to do so means psychic disintegration, so he fixes on a guilt which
further paralyzes him in various postures of the survivor syndrome.
The guilt itself may be extremely painful and in a tertiary maneuver
more amenable (in terms ef psychic econemy) aspects of the surviver
syndrome may be taken up. This accounts for the frequent difficulty
in locating elements of guilt on the landscape ef surviver pathology,
as it becomes further hidden in various other foci of the syndrome.
The survivor, as I havo suggested at various points along the way,
contends with a number ef vicious cycles

which impair efforts toward

mastery ef the experience. There are however these who have reported
cures of the surviver syndrome by breaking these cycles at certain key
points. Thero is also the heartening reminder ef the many survivors whe
live nermal lives, never seeming to require the therapist’s aid, or even
to have any difficulties in dealing with the event. The point, as many
psychiatrists and social workers agree, is that there seems te be & way
out ef the survivor’s dilomma. My own clinical experienco is nen-existont
and the thrust of this papor is entirely theoretical, but on just those
theoretical grounds I must take a radicaaly pessimistic stance. If the
dynamic of concentration camp surviver guilt is as I have posited it then
I see ‘'cure*' as an impossibilty, a totally unimpaired life as unachiev¬
able for these survivors. They are permanently marked and scarred by
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an encounter with death and absurdity that is unparalleled in
psychological history,

and if these survivors feel, as some do,

that they have been made the bearers of a unique vision I, for one,
would concur. I have spoken of thoir confrontation with mutant
death, but we ought to remember that it is mutant only by
definition of the psychological defenses we have erected around the
actuality of death. In existential actuality mutation simply
does not exist, for life as it is lived (not perceived) is absurd,
and since time immemorial man has spent effort trying to deny this
by a host of defenses that can be categorized as a sense of ©ntelegical
connectedness. Symbolic immortality and tho many transcendental
modes ef achieving it are the major part ef this attempt to deny
absurdity, and for most of us the denial is achieved,,
Sven as I write that we live an absurd existonce where death is
the only inevitable erder ef things I do not accept it. True I
believe it, but only in a distant, farfetched, highly intellectualized
way; my viscera de net give any indication of bolief. When we see
another die we cateh a glimpse ef the truth, but even then we are
protected from actuality by all the symbols we can muster to make
it a meaningful event that is net really an end. We have no sense
of an ending for even nothingness is given consolations.
But the survivor knows bettor. Ho has seen actuality as reality.
He has lived with and by absurdity, net in the blur ef a mushroom
cloud or the flash ef a flood, but as a d?ily routine in which
absurdity could net be consigned to such intellectable denominators
as "technology” or "nature." For the concentration camp survivor
absurdity and death were entirely within a human frame. It was carried
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out by and inflicted upon human beings in a facc-to-face moment.

For

the concentration camp survivor there can be no rationalizing away of
death, no philosophical elevation to seme higher order of events - they
breatneo oeath in quotidian extremity. The absurd universe was part of
their existence,

and beneath the neurotic defenses they erect it remains

such.
To put it very simply: survivors know death. For the surviver as
for no eno else this is a truth that cannet be adequately defended against
by the usual means.

Se for these who would say that they can cure the

surviver I woulci urge them to be wary. To remove the neurotic adaptations
of the survivor may be to force him to look at a truth that he knows,
one that could destroy his psychic integrity. The surviver must live
an impaired life for net to do so would mean he could have no life at
all. Perhaps the cycle of guilt can be broken in ways that will make
it less severe, but again, to remove the impairment may be to remove
the only defense.
I oan only hope that the lack of clinical experience has distorted
my purview of the situation. Perhaps I have net yet achieved a knowledge
of the resiliency of the human spirit that can only be gained beyond the
realm of idea and theory. If this is se, and my theoretical eenelusiens
are mistaken, no error would be mere welcome.
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